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Recalibrating Federal Judicial Independence
JAMES J. BRUDNEY*
It is well settled that independent courts play a vital role in promoting rule-of-law
and separation-of-powers norms. At the same timejudicial independence must be
reconciled with other values that we also wish to recognize as foundational.
Professor Brudney addresses two areas of controversy that are associated with the
celebration ofjudicial autonomy in our legal culture. He first discusses the role of
political and personal background factors in shaping judicial selection and
influencing judicial outcomes. He explains why both the President and Congress
have come to rely increasingly on such background factors when seeking to
anticipate the broad contours ofjudicial performance. While critical of occasional
excesses in that monitoring effort, Brudney argues for greater awareness of-and
sophistication about-the ways in which such pre-judicial background and
experiences contribute to the development of legal doctrine. Brudney then turns to
the realm ofstatutory interpretation, exploring the relationship between the norm of
legislative supremacy and the professed aspiration for a more dependentjudiciary.
In examining three major theories ofstatutory construction, Brudney suggests that
two of them-textualism and dynamic interpretation-are more likely to view
independent courts as acceptable if not preferred agents of social progress, while
the third theory-intentionalism-is inclined to be more respecOful of Congress's
authority and perhaps also more skeptical about the role of courts as independent
players in this particular policymaking arena.
INTRODUCTION
The concept of judicial independence is powerful yet elusive. A judiciary
liberated from improper influences is best able to vindicate rule-of-law and
separation-of-powers values that we regard as foundational. At the same time, which
influences qualify as improper will vary as one contemplates other important values
that may be served by having a somewhat less independent judiciary. In that regard,
one might distinguish, in rule-of-law terms, between the impact of an imminent threat
or bribe and the impact of ajudge's own political and personal experiences, or, from a
separation-of-powers perspective, between the constraints generated by a powerful
legislator's exparte telephone call and the constraints generated by legislative history
accompanying statutory text.I
* Newton D. Baker-Baker & Hostetler Chair in Law. Thanks to Victor Brudney, Ruth Colker,
Joshua Dressier, and Deborah Merritt for helpful comments, Stephen Barsotti and Steve Abreu for
fine research support, and Michele Whetzel-Newton for able assistance in preparation of the
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I See generally Kim Lane Scheppele, The History ofNormalcy: Rethinking LegalAutonomy
and the Relative Dependence ofLaw at the End ofthe Soviet Empire, 30 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 627,
628-31 (1996) (reviewing Inga Markovits' account of East German legal system).
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There are comparative dimensions to consider as well. In nascent or fragile
democratic settings, creating an independent judiciary often requires judges to engage
in certain nontraditional activities that American observers might deem disagreeably
"political." These include reaching out to the international judicial community to help
monitor domestic case law developments, or relying on back channel communication
with the executive branch to ward off political incursions.2 Further, within our own
constitutional system, federal judges enjoy a measure of formal independence from
electoral and financial pressures pursuant to Article 1]13 that is generally not available
at the state level.4
Yet even with respect to our constitutionally protected and mature federal
judiciary, there are discordant aspects to the current debate. Judicial autonomy is
rightly viewed as an important means to the two principal ends identified above.
Independent federal courts help secure the reasoned and consistent application of
judge-made or codified rules. They also help to provide an effective check on
excessive assertions of power by the political branches against individual citizens or
2 See, e.g., JENNIFER A. WIDNER, BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW 23-40, 98-113 (2001)
(examining efforts to buildjudicial independence in Tanzania and several other African countries
since the 1980s); Gibor Halmai & Kim Lane Scheppele, Living Well Is the Best Revenge: The
Hungarian Approach to Judging the Past, in TRANSrIONAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN NEW
DEMOCRACIES 155-84 (A. James McAdams ed., 1997) (analyzing efforts to develop judicial
independence in Hungary in the 1990s).
Judges in mature democracies may at times initiate outreach to international jurists. See Anne-
Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103, 1120-23 (2000). They also may
engage in back channel communications with the executive branch, although such exchanges tend
not to be favorably regarded by the legal community and the general public. See Louis L. Jaffe,
Professors and Judges as Advisors to Government: Reflections on the Roosevelt-Frankfurter
Relationship, 83 HARv. L. REv. 366,373-74(1969) (arguing that it undermines public confidence
in the judiciary forjustices to consult with government officials, including the President, and that
justices should give advice only through public testimony before committees of Congress and only
on matters relating to the administration of the courts). See generally Nonjudicial Activities of
Supreme Court Justices and Other Federal Judges: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation
of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91 st Cong. 116-18 (1969) (testimony of Hon.
Dean Acheson); id. at 136-38 (testimony of Prof. Alexander Bickel); id. at 325-29 (statement of
Prof. Ralph Winter).
3 U.S. CONST. art. m, § I (providing that federal judges "shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not
be diminished during their Continuance in Office"); see United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200,217-
30 (1980) (invalidating federal statutes postponing or repealing previously authorized salary
increases for federal judges).
4 See Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Ballot and the Bench, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 973,976 (2001)
(reporting that over 80% of state trial and appellatejudges stand for election of some type); Steven
P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CmI. L.
REV. 689, 725-26 (1995) (reporting that in thirty-eight of fifty states, most judges are electorally
accountable to the citizenry through initial and periodic elections or through periodic re-election
following an initial gubernatorial appointment).
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the states. An independent judiciary, however, is not alone sufficient to accomplish
those ends. Competent and honorable attorneys, respectful legislators and executive
officials, and the public's confidence in "the system" all figure importantly in
securing rule-of-law and separation-of-powers values. Moreover, at some point the
uncritical celebration of judicial independence may in fact adversely affect those
values, or other values that are important in our legal culture. Accordingly, it is worth
considering whether assertions about judicial independence in the federal context
warrant more circumspect attention and perhaps a less ambitious set of expectations.
One can begin by acknowledging the primacy ofjudicial independence in certain
core settings. Thus, independence would be inappropriately compromised, and the
rule of law undermined, if a federal judge had a financial or personal interest in acase
before him,5 or if he were assigned to a case with a view toward determining
outcomes.6 Similarly, independence would be disserved, and the separation of powers
thereby jeopardized, if ajudge were directly rebuked by executive branch officials for
a decision he had made, or harassed by members of Congress with respect to a case
he was about to decide.7
Beyond this relatively noncontroversial core, it becomes more difficult to separate
the aspirational from the real. For instance, an independent judiciary ideally promotes
respect for the rule of law by resolving each case through an openly administered and
broadly accessible decision structure. Such a process allows litigants and the
interested public to assess how seriously and thoughtfully a court deliberates in
reviewing the controversy at hand, as well as how consistently and persuasively it
applies legal precedent. Yet the emergent collective determination by the United
5 See Jill Abramson, Senate Convicts, Removes Hastings from Judgeship, WALL ST. J., Oct.
23, 1989, at A8 (reporting Senate conviction of District Judge Alcee Hastings on impeachment
article of conspiring to accept a bribe); Ruth Marcus, Senate Overwhelmingly Votes to Remove
U.S. Judge Nixon, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 1989, at A2 (reporting District Judge Walter Nixon's
conviction on impeachment article of lying about his personal involvement in case involving the
son of a business partner).
6 See J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Allison Herran Lee, NeutralAssignment ofJudges at the Court
ofAppeals, 78 TEx. L. REv. 1037 (2000) (discussing evidence that Fifth Circuit in the 1960s made
judicial panel assignments in some civil rights cases in an effort to produce "liberal" results).
7 See Abrahamson, supra note 4, at 988-90 (criticizing condemnation by media and
politicians of District Judge Harold Baer's decision to exclude certain drug-related evidence as
"creat[ing] a climate that underminesjudicial independence"); William Schneider, PoliticalPulse-
Getting out Front on the Crime Issue, NAT'L J., Apr. 13, 1996, at 854 (suggesting that Judge
Baer's reversal of his original decision was a capitulation to pressure from federal and state
politicians). There is, however, a sometimes fine line between such personal attacks and a robust
critique ofjudicial decisions and reasoning that is "indispensable to the intellectual integrity of the
judicial process and important in the development of the law." Abrahamson, supra note 4, at 990;
see also Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court v. Balance ofPowers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3,2001, at
A 13 (arguing that when the Supreme Court's decisions threaten to shift distribution of power
among branches, Congress and the President have a duty to respond, "at least through trenchant
public criticism").
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States Courts of Appeals to publish a mere 20% of their dispositions on the merits
casts doubt on whether attainment of that ideal is feasible or even desirable.8 Perhaps
public accountability and transparency are in many circumstances simply less
important than the need to allocate judicial energies in a prudent fashion, or to
channel the waves of potential precedent. 9
This article addresses two areas of controversy that are associated with the effort
to create and maintain judicial autonomy in our legal culture. Part I examines the role
of political and personal background factors in shaping judicial selection and
influencing judicial outcomes. Judges and some scholars have worried that inordinate
attention to these background experiences by politicians and academics may
compromise rule-of-law norms. Part I describes how these background factors serve
important competing values, and it encourages greater public attention to their role in
the appointment process. Further, by recognizing the often subtle relationship
between these background factors and judicial decisionmaking, Part I also suggests
certain limitations on the conception of judicial independence as an ideal.
Part 11 focuses on the realm of statutory interpretation, exploring the relationship
between a less independent judiciary and the separation-of-powers norm of legislative
supremacy. Part II discusses how two currently fashionable interpretive approaches-
textualism and dynamic interpretation-tend to promote judicial independence in
somewhat different ways, at the possible expense of legislative authority. Part RI
suggests that the preferred model for a federal court may be the somewhat more
dependent, albeit shopwom, approach of seeking to resolve statutory ambiguities
primarily by reference to the specific intent or general purpose of the enacting
legislature. The article concludes by maintaining that while an independent federal
8 See JUDICIAL BusiNEss OF THE UNITED STATES CouRTs: 2000 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR 44 tbl.S-3 (2001) (reporting that 79.8% of the 27,516 cases resolved on the merits
during the year ending September 30, 2000 were unpublished). The 79.8% figure reflects a
dramatic increase over a twenty-five year period. See Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney,
Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in the United States Courts ofAppeals, 54 VAND.
L. REv. 71, 75-76 (2001). Specialized services and electronic databases disseminate some
unpublished opinions, but their collections are not complete.
9 See generally Merritt & Brudney, supra note 8, at 73 (discussing conflicting policy
arguments as to the fairness of publication rules); id. at 121 (concluding from empirical study that
panels generally pursue neutral criteria when deciding which opinions to publish, but that wide
variation in publication rates among circuits resolving comparable claims, and evidence of partisan
disagreement within universe of unpublished decisions, raise troubling rule-of-law concerns).
Compare, e.g., Elizabeth M. Horton, Comment, Selective Publication and the Authority of
Precedent in the United States Courts ofAppeals, 42 UCLA L. REv. 1691 (1995), and Boyce F.
Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 177 (1999), with Martha J.
Dragich, Will the Federal Courts ofAppeals Perish if They Publish? OrDoes the Declining Use of
Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REv.
757, 785-802 (1995), and William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evaluation ofLimited
Publication in the United States Courts ofAppeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CI. L. REv. 573
(1981).
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judiciary is vital in certain core respects, increased attention to and candor about
dependent characteristics also are needed in order to place the judicial role in proper
perspective.
I. THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL BACKGROUND
A. Political Background and Judicial Selection
For at least the past seventy years, partisan political factors have played a central
role in the recruitment and confirmation of federal judges. Presidential appointments
of Supreme Court Justices reflect a strong interest in choosing individuals based on
"political and ideological compatibility."' 0 Nearly 90% of Justices are members of the
President's own party,"I and presidential observations as well as empirical research
confirm the further importance of ideological motivation when recruiting within party
limits. 12
10 HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS 2 (revised ed. 1999); see also
LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 34-49 (7th ed. 2001) (discussing influence of political
and ideological factors); TERRI JENNINGS PEREMrI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 85-93
(1999) (same).
I I See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME CoURT COMPENDIUM 318-21 (2d ed. 1996)
(reporting that from 1932 to 1994, sixteen of nineteen Justices appointed by Democratic presidents
and thirteen of fifteen appointed by Republican presidents have come from the President's own
party); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATrTUDINAL
MODEL 127 (1993) (reporting that from 1789 to 1992, 126 of 145 Supreme Court nominees (87%)
have come from the President's party).
12See E.W. Kenworthy, Nixon Scores 'Indulgence', N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 3, 1968, at Al
(reporting Nixon campaign pledge to appointjustices who would be less sympathetic to criminal
defendants and would be "strict constructionists" in contrast to Warren Court justices); LIvA
BAKER, MRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND PoLmCs 273-75 (1983) (discussing President Nixon's
emphasis on conservative judicial philosophy when considering replacement for Chief Justice
Warren); Sheldon Goldman, The Bush Imprint on the Judiciary: Carrying on a Tradition, 74
JUDICATURE 294, 297 (1991) (reporting that the first President Bush emphasized to his aides
handling judicial nominations his desire to appoint "highly qualified persons who are
philosophically conservative"); ABRAHAM, supra note 10, at 317 (reporting President Clinton's
declaration that he would "look for someone [for the Supreme Court] who believed in the
constitutional right to privacy ... who [was] pro-choice"); David L. Greene & Thomas Healy,
Bush Sends Judge List to Senate, BALT. SUN, May 10, 2001, at Al (reporting that the second
President Bush identified Justices Scalia and Thomas as federal judges he admires most, from
philosophical perspective); William E. Hulbary & Thomas G. Walker, The Supreme Court
Selection Process: Presidential Motivations and Judicial Performance, 33 W. POL. Q. 185, 189
(1980) (examining eighty-four Supreme Court nominations from 1789 to 1967 and finding that in
93% of cases, presidents were motivated by potential nominee's political philosophy).
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The story is substantially similar with respect to selection of lower federal court
judges. From Franklin Roosevelt to Bill Clinton, more than 90% of district judges' 3
and about 90% of appellate judges 14 came from the President's own political party.
Lower court judges may be selected in a less predictably ideological manner than
Supreme Court Justices, due in part to the moderating influence of home state
senators in the selection process.' 5 Since the mid 1970s, however, circuit court
appointments have been increasingly affected by presidentially established
nominating commissions and by advisory committees directed from the White
House. 16 Although these commissions and committees have emphasized professional
13 SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM
ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 349 (1997) (reporting that for districtjudges, 98.5% of Roosevelt's
133 appointees were Democratic, as were 93.8% of Truman's 97 appointees, 92.1% of the 229
Kennedy-Johnson appointees, and 90.6% of Carter's 202 appointees; while 95.2% of the 126
Eisenhower appointees were Republican, as were 89.6% of the 231 Nixon-Ford appointees, and
91.7% of the 290 Reagan appointees); Sheldon Goldman et al., Clinton's Judges: Summing Up the
Legacy, 84 JUDICATURE 228, 244 (2001) (reporting that for district court judges, 87.5% of
Clinton's 305 appointees were Democratic, while 88.5% of Bush's 148 appointees were
Republican; for each president, the remaining appointees were divided about equally between
those belonging to the other major political party and those with no political affiliation at all).
14 GOLDMAN, supra note 13, at 355 (reporting that for circuit court judges, 96% of
Roosevelt's 50 appointees were Democratic, as were 88.5% of Truman's 26 appointees, 95.1% of
the 61 Kennedy-Johnson appointees and 82.1% of Carter's 56 appointees (although only 4 Carter
appointees (7.1%) were Republican); while 93.3% of the 45 Eisenhower appointees were
Republican, as were 93.0% of the 57 Nixon-Ford appointees and 96.2% of the 78 Reagan
appointees); Goldman et al., supra note 13, at 249 (reporting that for circuit courtjudges, 85.2% of
Clinton's 61 appointees were Democratic and only 6.6% were Republican, while 89.2% of Bush's
37 appointees were Republican and only 2.7% were Democratic).
15 Home state senators from both parties may promote or oppose individual nominees;
because this senatorial influence often stems from a personal friendship or professional association
with a nominee or potential nominee, it may temper the ideological nature of lower court
appointments. Home state senators also may rely on the "blue slip" veto procedure that has
operated for decades within the Senate Judiciary Committee. See GOLDMAN, supra note 13, at
131-34, 173,209-11 (discussing importance ofhome state senator rule); id. at 11-12 (describing
blue slip veto procedure that allows home state senators from either party effectively to kill a
nominee's chances bymarking "objection" on the blue slip sent to them by counsel for the Senate
Judiciary Committee); KEVIN L. LYLES, THE GATEKEEPERS: FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS IN THE
POLITICAL PROCESS 58-59 (1997) (describing origins and historyofblue slip procedure); CHARLES
H. SHELDON & LINDA S. MAULE, CHOOSING JUSTICE: THE RECRUITMENT OF STATE AND FEDERAL
JUDGES 184-85 (1997) (same).
16 See GOLDMAN, supra note 13, at 238 (discussing Carter's creation of United States Circuit
Judge Nominating Commission in 1977); id. at 292, 300, 358 (discussing Reagan's creation of
Federal Judicial Selection Committee, chaired by White House Counsel); Goldman, supra note 12,
at 296-97 (discussing first President Bush's decision to continue the President's Committee on
Federal Judicial Selection, created under Reagan, and to continue the "systematic screening process
emphasizingjudicial philosophy" also begun under Reagan); Sheldon Goldman,Judicial Selection
Under Clinton: A Midterm Examination, 78 JUDICATURE 276, 278-79 (1995) (discussing
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qualifications, diversity of backgrounds, and scholarly perspective, 17 ideology has
come to play a more important role in appellate judge appointments, especially since
1980.18
Both partisan and ideological considerations also figure prominently in the
Senate's role as part of the judicial selection process. With respect to Supreme Court
Justices, a number of studies have found that confirmation rates are substantially
lower when the Senate is not controlled by the President's party,19 that most
unsuccessful nominations involve attempts to replace a justice with a nominee from
the opposite party,20 that party affiliation is especially important for controversial
nominations,21 and that "confirmation voting is decisively affected by the ideological
operation of Judicial Selection Group, a joint White House-Justice Department Committee);
Thomas Edsall, White House Prepares Judicial Nominating Blitz, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 2001, at
A29 (describing second Bush Administration's judicial selection process as directed by ad hoc
group of fifteen to twenty, comprised of staffers in White House Counsel's office and Justice
Department appointees). For an argument that presidential selection of appellate court candidates
has become distinctly more politicized and policy-oriented since the Carter Administration, see
Elliot E. Slotnick, A Historical Perspective on Federal Judicial Selection, 86 JUDICATURE 13, 14-
15(2002).
17 See GOLDMAN, supra note 13, at 238-50 (discussing emphasis on affirmative action and
professional qualifications in Carter Commission's operations); Goldman, supra note 12, at 297
(discussing first President Bush's instructions that recruitment should be targeted to highly
qualified persons and also to searching out "appropriately qualified women and minorities").
18 See GOLDMAN, supra note 13, at 296-319 (discussing importance of policy and ideology in
Reagan Administration selection of appellate judges); Goldman, supra note 12, at 296-97
(emphasizing importance of conservative ideology in first Bush Administration); Dick Lehr,
Clinton Vow on Roe Examined Anew, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 1, 1992, at 24 (reporting Clinton's
pledge as presidential candidate that his Supreme Court nominees would have to "be strong
supporters of Roe v. Wade"); Edsall, supra note 16 (emphasizing that second Bush
Administration's judicial selection process "has been dominated by deeply conservative legal
strategists"); Dan Carney & Alexandra Starr, New Order in the Court, Bus. WK., Apr. 23,2001, at
88 (reporting that second President Bush's judicial selection committee is controlled by
"committed conservatives," many of whom belong to the Federalist Society).
19 See, e.g., BAUM, supra note 10, at 52; SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 11, at 144-45.
20 See P.S. Ruckman, Jr., The Supreme Court, Critical Nominations, and the Senate
Confirmation Process, 55 J. POL. 793,797 (1993); see also EPSTEIN ETAL., supra note 11, at 317-
20 (listing seven rejected nominees between 1894 and 1987; three were nominated byDemocratic
presidents to replace Republican justices and three more were nominated by Republican presidents
to replace Democratic justices).
21 See SEGAL& SPAETH, supra note 11, at 139, 142 (reporting that for Bork nomination, 96%
of Senate Democrats opposed nominee, and 87% of Republicans supported him, while for Thomas
nomination, 81% of Democrats opposed the nominee and 95% of Republicans supported him);
John D. Felice & Herbert F. Weisberg, The Changing Importance ofldeology, Party, and Region
in Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominees, 77 KY. L.J. 509, 518-21 (1989) (reporting that for
nine controversial nominations between 1950s and 1980s, Republican Senators supported
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distance between senators and nominees." 22 Similarly, there is ample evidence that
political partisanship and ideology affect the dynamics and results of the confirmation
process for appellate and district court judges. Presidents are less successful in
moving their nominees when faced with a Senate controlled by the opposite party,23
and less able to appoint nominees based on presidential policy considerations when
the home state senator or the Judiciary Committee chairman has divergent policy
preferences. 24
Empirical research that identifies factors influencing aggregate judicial selection
cannot, of course, adequately explain the complex nomination and confirmation
process for individual judges. Presidents and administration officials, senators and
their staffs, and interested constituency groups each bring a diverse set of motives to
the table when developing and winnowing a particular list of recommended
candidates. 25
Republican presidents' nominees at 86% rate, but supported Democratic presidents' nominees at
only 44% rate).
22 Charles M. Cameron et al., Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees: A Neoinstitutional
Model, 84 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 525, 530 (1990); see Felice & Weisberg, supra note 21, at 525
(reporting that influence of ideology on confirmation voting for nine controversial Supreme Court
justices is significant even after controlling for partisanship); Donald R. Songer, The Relevance of
Policy Values for the Confirmation ofSupreme Court Nominees, 13 LAW & SoC'Y REv. 927, 946
(1979) (reporting that policy disagreement with the nominee was the major cause of votes against
confirmation for fourteen controversial nominations studied).
23 See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton's First Term Judiciary: Many
Bridges to Cross, 80 JUDICATURE 254,255 (1997) (reporting that Clinton nominees to lower courts
experienced substantially reduced rate of confirmation success following Republican takeover of
Senate in 1994); Goldman et al., supra note 13, at 233-34, 239-41 (reporting that Clinton
nominees experienced unusual delays and lack of success during 106th Congress, which featured
public bitterness over several confirmation battles for lower court appointments); Sheldon
Goldman, Reagan's Judicial Legacy: Completing the Puzzle and Summing Up, 72 JUDICATURE
318, 319 (1989) (reporting that following Democratic takeover of Senate in 1986, new majority
used its power to delay many Reagan nominees and derail a number of others).
24 See, e.g., Michael W. Giles et al., Picking Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan
Selection Agendas, 54 POL. RES. Q. 623,638 (2001) (reporting that lower court appointments from
1952 to 1988 were more responsive to home state political milieu-and less responsive to
presidential policy agenda--when courtesy toward the senator from the President's own party was
a factor); Roger E. Hartley & Lisa M. Holmes, Increasing Senate Scrutiny ofLower Federal Court
Nominees, 80 JUDICATURE 274,276-78 (1997) (reporting that since early 1970s, when chairman of
Senate Judiciary Committee votes consistently against the President on key issues, there is more
delay and rejection in the confirmation process); see also Howard Kurtz, GOP Senators Foiledon
Judicial Nominees: Justice Department Is Suspected of Basing Opposition on Ideological
Grounds, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 1987, at A17 (reporting on conflicts between Reagan
Administration and moderate Republican senators whose choices for lower federal courtjudges
were delayed or rejected on ideological grounds).
25 See generally BAUM, supra note 10, at 34-59.
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Nor should these studies be read to suggest that political factors are the primary
qualification for ascending to the federal bench. There is an expectation that suitable
candidates should be sufficiently accomplished in terms of their legal abilities,
temperament, and professional experience. The American Bar Association has
evaluated candidates on such merit-based grounds since the Truman Administration,
and until recently, both Congress and the Executive Branch have utilized those
evaluations. 26
This focus on lawyerly competence is surely rational: neither the Justice
Department nor the White House has an interest in installing mediocre or disreputable
individuals on the federal bench.27 As a regular repeat player in federal litigation, the
Executive Branch should prefer judges who are likely to apply language, precedent,
and logical reasoning in rigorous and relatively foreseeable fashion when deciding
cases. The President's party may also see some political value in appointing a "high
quality" judiciary that is well received by the organized bar and the informed media.
Yet while merit-based considerations are both necessary and important, they have
not been viewed as sufficient by either of the two branches constitutionally charged
with designating members of the federal bench. Political and ideological background
have been relied upon by presidents, senators, and their staffs when choosing from
within a pool of talented and experienced candidates. Rather than regard such reliance
26 See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 10, at 23-28; DAVID M. O'BRIEN, JUDICIAL
ROULETTE: REPORT OF THE TWENTIEth CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL SELECnON 81-94
(1988); GEORGE WATSON & JOHN A. STOOKEY, SHAPING AMERICA: THE POLMCS OF SUPREME
COURT APPOINTMENTS 83-85, 108-12 (1995). But see Amy Goldstein, Bush Curtails ABA Role in
Selecting US. Judges, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2001, at Al (reporting second President Bush's
decision to discontinue fifty-year tradition of executive branch reliance on ABA for advice on
potential candidates for federal bench). The ABA role in candidate evaluation has itself been
criticized as "political" over the years, although perceptions of its political orientation have shifted.
Compare, e.g., Elliot E. Slotnick, The ABA Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary: A
Contemporary Assessment, 66 JUDICATURE 385, 392-93 (1983) (concluding that ABA rating
system favored white male candidates from traditional legal practice backgrounds), with Terry
Carter, A Conservative Juggernaut, A.B.A. J., June 1997, at 32 (reporting Senate Judiciary
Committee Chairman's decision to end formal ABA role of advising Senate, based on his view the
Association was too liberal).
27 See GOLDMAN, supra note 13, at 4 note c (discussing why it is good politics as well as
good presidential policy to recruit and nominate highly qualifiedjudges). The unsuccessful effort
by certain senators to make a virtue out of mediocrity with respect to a Supreme Court nominee
illustrates the outlier nature of such anti-merit sentiments. See ABRAHAM, supra note 10, at 11
(recounting comments by Senator Hruska, floor manager for the Carswell nomination, that "[e]ven
if he is mediocre there are a lot of mediocre judges and people and lawyers. They are entitled to a
little representation, aren't they, and a little chance? We can't have all Brandeises, Cardozos, and
Frankfurters, and stuff like that there"). But cf JOHN W. DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE 125-26,
133-42, 187 (2001) (discussing President Nixon's willingness to consider mediocre or even
outrageous candidates for the Supreme Court in 1971, at least partly as a form of payback for the
Senate's previous rejection of his nominees).,
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as a threat tojudicial autonomy, one could view it as promoting a constructive form of
judicial dependence on the politically accountable branches.
Over the past several decades, constitutional and statutory interpretation have
become matters of intense political conflict and controversy. Judicial appointments
play a role in this controversy because executive branch officials understandably
perceive the courts in part as vehicles that can either support or undermine their policy
agenda. The Executive Branch often wants the courts to enforce certain legal rules
expansively while urging that they exercise restraint in other areas of public law. 28
Indeed these preferences may on occasion shift rather suddenly depending on which
political party is shaping the federal government's judicial agenda.29
The perception that courts are important as policymakers has become even more
widespread during our prolonged era of divided government, in which presidents find
it very difficult to steer their own legislative program through a Congress effectively
controlled by the opposite party.30 The White House and executive branch agencies
regularly must manage a range of imbedded regulatory schemes addressed to civil
rights, workplace protections, the environment, and other politically controversial
matters. In this setting, executive branch officials may well find court-centered
implementation strategies more meaningful than efforts at legislative reform.31
28 See generally Jeremy Rabkin, At the President's Side: The Role of the White House
Counsel in Constitutional Policy, 56 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 85-86 (1993) (discussing
White House influence in shaping Justice Department strategy on civil rights litigation before
Supreme Court).
29 See, e.g., REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL 61 (1992) (reporting Reagan
Administration's 1982 reversal of Solicitor General's position regarding the constitutionality of
tax-exempt status for a private college that discriminated on basis of race; the Supreme Court
subsequently appointed private attorney to argue Government's position from lower courts);
Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Supreme Court: Highlights from the Marshall
Papers, 23 ENVTL. L. REP. 10606, 10614 (1993) (describing Reagan Administration Justice
Department efforts to advocate less expansive approach toward enforcement of occupational health
standards by shifting government's position in midst of 1981 Supreme Court litigation); Michael
Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case ofHousing and Employment, 45
UCLA L. REv. 1401, 1439-41 (1998) (reporting Clinton Administration's 1993 reversal ofprior
Justice Department position on retroactivity of 1991 Civil Rights Act). See generally John
Ferejohn, Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law, LAw & CONTEMpv. PROBS., Summer 2002, at
43-44,63-65 (discussing politicization ofjudicial decisionmaking as more developed under U.S.
legal traditions than in Europe).
30 Between 1968 and 2002, Congress (at least one chamber) and the Presidency were
controlled by different parties for all years except 1977-80, 1993-94, and 2001.
31 See generally Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, The Government LitigantAdvantage:
Implications for the Law, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 391 (2000) (discussing Government's ability to
pursue its policy program successfully before Supreme Court by selective filing of petitions for
certiorari); Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by FederalAdministrative
Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 692-718 (1989) (discussing Government's ability to maximize its
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Further, in areas where federal regulation is less comprehensive or even largely
absent, private litigation before the federal courts may effectively help shape public
policy, as has occurred on subjects as diverse as tobacco use, patients' rights, and the
development of the intemet.32
Congress too has a policy-related stake in the judicial selection process. As a
general proposition, legislators would prefer that courts adhere to the purposive
agenda codified by prior Congresses, just as they expect courts in the future to be
bound by the laws they enact today.33 Current majorities also may have a particular
interest in confirming judges who will not undermine preferred regulatory
enactments.34 Admittedly, the current majority party has the option to monitor
judicial performance after the fact, at least with respect to certain high profile
regulatory statutes that it wishes to see vigorously applied.35 In addition, both parties
policy preferences in lower courts by refusing to change agency behavior because of a loss in a
particular district or appellate court).
32 See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (adjudicating tobacco
manufacturer's right to engage in outdoor and point-of-sale cigarette and cigar advertising); Pa.
Psychiatric Soc. v. Green Spring Health Serv. Inc., 280 F.3d 278 (3d Cir. 2002) (adjudicating
professional association's right to sue HMOs for impairing quality of health care provided by its
members); see also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (adjudicating
extent of Government's ability to regulate access to internet). See generally Joseph A. Califano,
Yes, Litmus Test Judges, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 2001, at A23 (discussing role of federal courts as
"powerful architects of public policy").
33 See, e.g., McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 180, 185-86 (1999) (discussing risk that courts will try to impose their own policy
preferences, subtly or profoundly altering a political compromise years after its enactment); John
Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, Limitation ofStatutes: Strategic Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J.
565, 581 (1992) (suggesting that each enacting Congress wants its laws enforced and
sympathetically applied into the future, and that courts can encourage sitting legislators to act
carefully and deliberatively by interpreting earlier legislative products in a sensitive fashion).
34 See, e.g., Senate Judiciary Comm. Hearings on Nomination of Susan W. Liebeler to be
Judge for US. Court of Appeals for Federal Circuit, 100th Cong. 1, 69-79 (1987) (reporting
questioning ofnominee on her role undermining enforcement of anti-dumping trade laws; nominee
ultimately failed to receive a vote in full Senate); Senate Judiciary Comm. Hearings on
Nomination of Jefferson B. Sessions III to be US. District Court Judge for Southern District of
Alabama, 99th Cong. 2-3, 181-87, 196-203,240-41 (1986) (reporting testimony on nominee's
role undermining enforcement of Voting Rights Act; nominee ultimately rejected by Committee).
35 The 1991 Civil Rights Act overrode all or parts of numerous Supreme Court decisions. See
H.R. Rep. No. 102-40, pt. I, at 23-92 (1991) (reviewing action to override or modify results from
ten Supreme Court decisions); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court
Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991) (discussing override statutes from
1967 to 1990). But cf ROBERT A. KATZMANN, CouRTS AND CONGRESS 71-74 (1997) (reporting
very low congressional staff awareness of important statutory interpretation decisions by the D.C.
Circuit).
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are likely to be especially interested in reviewing judicial decisions that limit
congressional power or authority. 36
Yet while Congress remains free to invalidate judicial interpretations of a federal
statute with which the majority disagrees, it is exceedingly difficult to secure such
invalidations through the legislative process. This difficulty stems both from the lack
of time and information needed to monitor statutory interpretation decisions and from
the procedural and resource constraints that inhibit legislative success.37 Further,
when the Senate does not candidly consider the ideology or judicial philosophy of
nominees, it tends instead to pursue alternative strategies that may be disingenuous if
not unseemly, such as review of a nominee's past non-ideological indiscretions38 or
his asserted ethical misconduct in the private sphere. 39
36 See, e.g., Should Ideology Matter?: Judicial Nominations, 2001, Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th
Cong. (2001) [hereinafter 2001 Hearing] (statement of Chairman Schumer) (indicating plan to
hold future hearing on "the significance of the Supreme Court's recent federalism decisions forthe
judicial selection process"); Senate Committee Passes Bill Requiring State Compliance With
ADEA, DAILY LAB. REP., Sept. 20,2001, at 1116-17 (reporting on bill that uses Article I Spending
Clause authority to require that states waive their sovereign immunity from the ADEA ifthey are to
receive certain federal program funds; bill would effectively circumvent Supreme Court decision in
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents).
37 See Stefanie A. Lindquist & David A. Yalof, Congressional Responses to Federal Circuit
Court Decisions, 85 JUDICATURE 61, 63-64, 68 (2001) (reviewing 966 committee reports
accompanying every bill reported out of House, Senate, or conference committee from 1990 to
1998, and finding enacted bills responded to sixty-five circuit court cases (clarifying, codifying or
overriding), and reports referred to total of 187 specific circuit court cases out of more than
200,000 decisions in that nine-year period). See generally JOHN W. KiNGDON, AGENDAS,
ALTERNATIVES, AND PuBUc PoUClEs 41-42, 194 (1984) (discussing limitations on members'
access to sophisticated policy information and on the political capital available to each senator or
representative).
38 See, e.g., Adell Crowe, People Watch, USA TODAY, Sept. 29, 1987, at A4 (describing how
local Washington, D.C. 'paper obtained list of videos rented by Supreme Court nominee Robert
Bork's wife to investigate whether Bork might have watched X-rated films); Steven V. Roberts,
Ginsburg Withdraws Name as Supreme Court Nominee, Citing Marijuana 'Clamor', N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 8, 1987, at A I (describing how reports of Douglas Ginsburg's marijuana smoking while a
Harvard law professor led to his withdrawing as Supreme Court nominee). See generally 2001
Hearing, supra note 36, at 2 (statement of Chairman Schumer) (observing that "since the Bork
fight in 1987, ideology, while still an important factor for the Senate, has primarilybeen considered
sub-rosa, fostering a search for a nominee's disqualifiers that are more personal and less
substantive").
39 See, e.g., Club Membership ofJudicial Nominees: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, -101st Cong. (1990) (reflecting concern of liberal interest groups and committee
members aboutjudicial nominees who belong to private clubs that discriminate against women or
minorities); ROGER K. NEwMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 239, 247-63 (2d ed. 1997)
(discussing concerns fueled if not inspired by conservative anti-New Deal media and interest
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In short, reliance by the Executive Branch and the Senate on political and
ideological background has been a substantial element of the judicial selection
process. When appropriately combined with a threshold concern for meritorious
candidates, such reliance limits the pool of suitable individuals in a way that is not
"neutral" but that is meant to serve democratic accountability interests. The White
House and the Senate majority each has sought to shade the future philosophy of the
judiciary toward its own broadly conceived public policy preferences. The fact that
those preferences have often conflicted during our prolonged period of divided
government has led each branch to emphasize the importance of tempering excesses
by the other.40 It is in this setting that presidents and senators seem to believe they can
use partisanship and ideological background to help them anticipate the judicial
behavior of current and prospective candidates for the federal bench.
B. Political Background and Decisional Influences
Insofar as the political branches are engaged in efforts to predict how judges will
perform, it is worth asking whether these efforts have been successful. The answer, I
think, is a somewhat qualified yes. The qualification involves a recognition that for
many controversies reaching the federal courts, the applicability of a controlling legal
rule or principle can be readily determined. Through discussion and reflection
regarding the meaning of textual language, the relevance of judicial or agency
precedent, and the persuasive force of logical reasoning, judges often engage in
routine dispute resolution or correct clear errors made by a lower tribunal.
At the same time, many other legal disputes do not generate such clear answers.
In this set of cases, plausible competing arguments based on "objective" rules or legal
doctrine require judges to exercise considerable discretion when reaching their results.
Such discretion may be called for particularly at the appellate and Supreme Court
levels, where the parties, and their supporting interest groups, are likely to invest
substantial resources to demonstrate the persuasive force of each law-based
alternative. 4' Appellate judges themselves disagree as to how often such legal
groups to reveal Senator Black's earlier membership in Ku Klux Klan as means of defeating his
Supreme Court appointment).
40 See generally Jon 0. Newman, Federal Judicial Selection: A Judge's View, 86
JUDiCATURE 10, 12 (2002) (discussing role of Senate in steering President's judicial appointments
toward the middle, reflecting country's message to both political branches that "We are sort of in
the middle."); Stephen B. Burbank, Politics, Privilege & Power: The Senate's Role in the
Appointment ofFederal Judges, 86 JUDICATURE 24, 26 (2002) (discussing how presidents' more
distinct policy agenda in selecting judicial nominees has triggered increased attention by senators
to those nominees).
41 See Tracey E. George, Court Fixing, 43 ARIZ. L. REv. 9, 32 (2001) (discussing empirical
support for hypothesis that appellate judges have greater decisionmaking discretion and are less
constrained by doctrine than district court judges). Apart from occasional strategic behavior on
appeal to delay inevitable outcomes, litigating parties are unlikely to spend tens or hundreds of
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indeterminacy occurs.42 Nonetheless, its relatively frequent occurrence provides
scope for judges to rely, even if subconsciously, on their individual values or
preferences.
In this regard, ample evidence exists that party affiliation is a significant predictor
of voting patterns by federal judges. Since the early 1960s, an impressive array of
empirical studies has tended to confirm that the political party of the appointing
president or the judge makes a difference in a number of discrete subject matter areas.
For example, it can be said with some confidence that appellate court judges
appointed by Democrats are more likely than their Republican-appointed counterparts
to cast votes favoring stronger regulation of the economy, construing generously
employee protection statutes, and limiting the powers of prosecutors in criminal
settings. 43
thousands of dollars unless they perceive a "close" legal question. See generally George L. Priest
& Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STuD. 1, 4-5 (1984).
42 Compare Charles E. Clark & David M. Trubek, The Creative Role ofthe Judge: Restraint
and Freedom in the Common Law Tradition, 71 YALE L.J. 255, 256 n.7 (1961) (reporting Judge
Clark's estimate that for three hundred appeals he reviewed on the Second Circuit over a two year
period, "clear one-way cases comprised at least 70%, while around 10% were highly original cases
... [and i]n the remaining 20%, the outcome actuallyproved certain, but counsel might be forgiven
for thinking they had a bare chance of success"), and Harry T. Edwards, The Role of a Judge in
Modern Society: Some Reflections on Current Practice in Federal Appellate Adjudication, 32
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 385,409 (1983-84) (referring to the occasional "very hard" case), with Richard
A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the
Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 179, 190-91 (1986) (maintaining that in appellate
litigation, unclear cases-with textual uncertainty and credible contextual arguments for both
sides-outnumber the clear cases), and Judith S. Kaye, The Human Dimension in Appellate
Judging: A Brief Reflection on a Timeless Concern, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1004, 1007-09 (1988)
(suggesting she found frequent gaps and anomalies in statutory law).
43 For examples of recent studies linking political affiliation tojudicial behavior in the courts
of appeals, see James J. Brudney, Sara Schiavoni & Deborah J. Merritt, Judicial Hostility Toward
Labor Unions? Applying the Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIo ST. L.J.
1675, 1715 tbl.IH (1999) (finding that Democratic appointees to courts of appeals were significantly
more likely than Republican appointees to favor unions' legal positions); Robert A. Carp et al., The
Voting Behavior ofJudges Appointed by President Bush, 76 JUDICATURE 298,300 (1993) (finding
significant party-related voting differences within areas of criminal justice, civil rights and liberties,
and labor and economic relations); Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of
Decisionmaking on US. Courts of Appeals, 58 OHMo ST. L.J. 1635, 1678-86 (1998) (finding
significant party-related voting differences on wide range of issues); Jon Gottschall, Reagan's
Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals: The Continuation of a Judicial Revolution, 70
JUDICATURE 48, 51-54 (1986) (finding significant party-related voting differences in civil rights
and civil liberties cases); Donald R. Songer & Sue Davis, The Impact of Party and Region on
Voting Decisions in the United States Courts ofAppeals, 43 W. POL. Q. 317, 324 (1990) (finding
significant party-related voting differences on cases involving labor relations, criminal law, First
Amendment, and civil rights issues). For a thoughtful review of the empirical literature linking
presidential expectations to the performance of Supreme Court justices, see PERETr, supra note
10, at 111-17.
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These empirical studies are hardly uniform, and they are subject to
methodological limitations if not criticism. There is some research concluding that
political party lacks significant predictive power in comparable areas of substantive
law.44 In addition, studies identifying partisan-based differences in voting behavior
have often focused on highly controversial or divisive cases, raising potential
problems of selection bias.45 Other studies have examined the behavior of judges
appointed by a single president, or reviewed decisions in a compressed time frame,
thereby ignoring the possibly substantial variation in political saliency for a particular
legal subject matter area over decades.46 Finally the studies indicating that partisan
affiliation has some predictive value address trends among cohorts of judges who
have either Democratic or Republican affiliation; they do not purport to identify how
an individual judge will vote in a specific case.
Despite these caveats, there is now far too much evidence to deny that the
political background of judges has helped predict patterns of voting in the federal
courts. Upon reflection, it would be surprising if the results were otherwise. Executive
branch advisers, senators and their staffs, and various aligned interest groups47 would
not continue to invest substantial resources and energies in the political and
ideological aspects ofjudicial selection if they did not accurately perceive that those
44 See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial
Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STuD. 257, 281 (1995) (finding no difference
between judges appointed by Republican and Democratic presidents in three district courts with
respect to their treatment of civil rights cases); Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on
the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1377, 1466
(1998) (finding no significant variance between district judges appointed by Republican and
Democratic presidents regarding decisions on constitutional validity of federal sentencing
guidelines); Donald R. Songer & Susan Haire, IntegratingAlternative Approaches to the Study of
Judicial Voting: Obscenity Cases in the U.S. Courts ofAppeals, 36 AM. J. POL. S. 963,977-79
(1992) (finding political party of appointing president not to be a significant determinant of federal
appellate judge behavior in obscenity cases).
45 See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules ofInference, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1,31-34 (2002)
(criticizing studies that attempt to make inferences about the "state of the law" by focusing on a
few key cases); Merritt & Brudney, supra note 8, at 115-16 (indicating how analysis of published
decisions alone gives rise to erroneous conclusions); Ashenfelter et al., supra note 44, at 258-59
(discussing problems of selection bias in studies of published decisions).
46See Lawrence Baum, Comparing the Policy Positions of Supreme Court Justices from
Different Periods, 42 W. POL. Q. 509,512-16 (1989) (examining difficulty ofcomparing Supreme
Court votes on civil liberties issues during Burger Court era versus period from 1946 to 1969);
Brudney, Schiavoni, & Merritt, supra note 43, at 1738-39, 1763 (recognizing obstacles to
comparing appellate court votes on labor relations issues during period since early 1980s versus
period from 1946 to mid-1970s).
47 See David G. Savage, Court Nominee Warfare Opens Senate, L.A. TIMEs, July6, 2001, at
Al 8 (reporting on Tom Jipping's Free Congress Foundation (Republicans) and Nan Aron's
Alliance for Justice (Democrats) as powerful groups that have focused on judicial selection since
late 1970s).
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aspects had some impact on judicial decisionmaking. That same perception also
seems implicit in the perspective adopted byjudicial scholars who expect the federal
courts as a whole to be broadly shaped by the prevailing political consensus,48 and
who are prepared to criticize judges as "activist"-in either liberal or conservative
directions-based on assertedly substantial departures from the values embodied in
that consensus.49
To be sure, there are risks that undue emphasis on political or ideological
background in the selection process may threaten respect for the judicial enterprise. 50
At the same time, a proper appreciation for such background when assessing the
factors that contribute to decisionmaking may help deepen our understanding of how
legal doctrine develops or is applied. A recent empirical example illustrates this latter
point.
In studying over 1100 labor-management relations cases decided by the courts of
appeals between 1985 and 1992, Deborah Merritt and I discovered that judges
appointed by Democratic presidents were significantly more likely than Republican-
appointed judges to support the union's legal position in unpublished cases.51
Assuming arguendo that the circuit courts restrict publication to decisions that have
48See ROBERTG. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 230-31 (3d ed., revised by
Sanford Levinson 2000) (observing that over two hundred years, Court's interests and values have
often shifted in the presence of changing national conditions, and suggesting that "judges have
often agreed with the main current of public sentiment because they were themselves part of that
current [more than] because they feared to disagree with it"); 2001 Heating, supra note 36, at 57-
60 (testimony of Prof. Cass R. Sunstein) (advocating importance of having an appropriate
ideological mix of liberal and conservative justices on Supreme Court).
49 See generally John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920, 933-47 (1973).
50 Partisan-related attention within the legislative and executive branches could seek to
produce more than general predictive value through litmus test screening that asks candidates to
make advance commitments on specific issues of constitutional or statutory interpretation.
Notwithstanding ample accusatory rhetoric from both political parties, that type of screening
appears not to have been adopted. Senators and presidents have publicly eschewed such an
approach, fearing that it would compromise the principled core of judicial decisionmaking by
undermining the idea that courts should engage in a relatively objective effort to apply legal rules
to particular facts. See, e.g., 2001 Hearing, supra note 36, at 30 (statement of Sen. Hatch)
(contending that "the Senate's responsibility to provide advice and consent [should] not include an
ideological litmus test because a nominee's personal opinions are largely irrelevant so long as the
nominee can set those opinions aside and follow the law fairly and impartially as ajudge"); Nat
Hentoff, To Get a Supreme Court Seat, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 1999, at A 17 (reporting candidate
George W. Bush's statement that he would not require an ideological litmus test for the Supreme
Court). But cf id. (reporting candidate Bill Clinton's 1992 statement to Bill Moyers that he would
want his first Supreme Court appointee to be a strong supporter of Roe v. Wade, although it
"makes me uncomfortable" to be taking such a litmus test position).
51 Merritt & Brudney, supra note 8, at 110 tbI.X. For an explanation of how we controlled for
various other influences in our regression equation, see id. at 108-09.
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precedential value or "add to the body of law," 52 it seems that Democratic judges are
favoring unions (or Republican judges disfavoring them) in cases that apply settled
legal standards in an uncontroverted factual context. Does this mean that federal
judges are pre-determining outcomes in some "unprincipled" way based on their prior
political affiliations? I seriously doubt it. What is more likely, as Merritt and I
suggested, is that judges simply differ in the way they apply the law and that some of
these differences can be generalized. Thus, a Democrat-appointed judge may "see" an
unlawful retaliatory motive when an employer disciplines a union supporter during an
election campaign, while a Republican-appointed judge may not see such a motive on
the same facts. 53 Or a Republican-appointed judge may regard management's
unyielding positions during collective negotiations as legitimate "hard bargaining,"
while a Democrat-appointed judge views the same actions as unlawful bad faith.
Such perceived differences in the implementation of a declared rule of law are in
one sense unavoidable, as judges invoke pliable legal standards to assess equivocal
human conduct. At the same time, Merritt and I are hardly alone in observing that
"law" in the lower federal courts often consists of extending these rules or standards
to relatively novel factual settings. Insofar as judges diverge in predictable ways when
applying well rooted legal principles, they demonstrate that political experience or
perspective can inform the meaning of settled doctrine while contributing to even the
most routine judicial decisions.
Recognizing that such experience may at times have a more than anecdotal effect
need not jeopardize our commitment to the ideal of judges acting independently to
apply established legal rules. It may, however, call for greater candor in
acknowledging the politically-related factors that can affect such independent
performance. Nor does enhanced public understanding need to produce a more
skeptical or cynical view ofjudicial decisionmaking. Increased awareness by litigants
of the ways in which judges approach the same facts from different perspectives
could encourage more thoughtful attention to the development of those facts in court,
as well as to the underlying meaning of the legal rules. 54 Such awareness might also
52 Id. at 76-77 (reviewing publication rules that are comparable in all circuits). But cf id. at
112-13 (discussing substantial variation in actual publication rates among the courts, even after
controlling for caseload and numerous other factors, suggesting that judges apply similar
publication criteria in very different ways).
53 Seeid. at 116.
54 That thoughtful focus might be augmented through some relaxation of the limits on
publication that have been adopted by the circuit courts. For example, one troubling finding in the
Merritt & Brudney study of over 1100 published and unpublished cases was that unpublished
decisions increasingly rejected unions' legal claims over the course of the seven years from 1987 to
1993, while published opinions showed no such tendency. Accordingly, it is likely that litigants
who relied exclusively on published opinions may have received inaccurate signals aboutjudicial
trends, even if those trends were simply that courts over this seven year period applied existing
legal standards in a way that increasingly favored employers. See Merritt & Brudney, supra note 8,
at 110 tbI.X, 110-11,117-18.
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encourage judges to become somewhat more self-conscious, and mutually
communicative, about the perspectives they bring to their deliberative enterprise.
C. Personal Values and Diversity
Although social scientists studying judicial behavior have devoted much of their
attention to the influence of political background and experience, it should be
apparent that each judge's broader personal makeup also influences her
decisionmaking calculus.55 Justice Cardozo in his 1921 Storrs Lectures famously
remarked about the role played by "the complex of instincts and emotions and habits
and convictions, which make the man."56 In sifting through competing arguments,
judges inevitably draw on this welter of experiences and attitudes as part of their
effort to render a just legal result.
Federal judges have become increasingly open, if not entirely comfortable,
acknowledging the value-laden aspects of judging. In a 1970s study of thirty-five
appellate court judges from three circuits, almost all indicated on background that
they regarded their personal views of justice as important in deciding cases, even
when there was clear and relevant precedent. 57 More recently, appellate judges have
been willing to express "on the record" their views that personal values are, and ought
to be, part of their decisionmaking enterprise. These judges insist that written
opinions, analyzing language and precedent based on well-established interpretive
norms, are central to the j udiciary's legitimate role in our legal culture.58 Yet they also
55 In the first part of this section, I draw upon research and observations from a recent article
coauthored with Corey Ditslear. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Designated Diffidence:
District Court Judges on the Courts ofAppeals, 35 LAw& Soc'Y REv. 565, 569-71 (2001).
56 BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 167 (1921); see also Joseph
C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function ofthe "Hunch "in Judicial Decision, 14
CORNELL L.Q. 274, 278-79 (1929) (describing role of subjective intuitions and insights in
renderingjudicial decisions, and analogizingjudge's role in exercising those faculties to a gambler
or short story detective).
57 J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM: A
STUDY OF THE SECOND, FIFTH, AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRcurrs, at xix, 164 (1981)
(presenting findings on political values and role perceptions based on not-for-attribution interviews
with active and senior judges from Second, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits between 1969 and 1971;
thirty-one of thirty-five judges reported their personal views of justice were very important
(seventeen) or moderately important (fourteen) to their decisionmaking, while clear and relevant
precedent was very important (thirty-two) or moderately important (two) for thirty-four of thirty-
five). In cases where the legal rules were uncertain, itself a matter involving varied individual
perceptions, these judges ranked their personal views of justice as "very important," according
them slightly more weight than the closest applicable circuit court ruling. See id. at 164-65.
58 See, e.g., FRANK COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE 55-57, 201-02 (1980) (discussing
importance of authority, interpretive rules, and "the constraint of writing"); Shirley S. Abrahamson,
Judging in the Quiet ofthe Storm, 24 ST. MARY's L.J. 965, 987-88 (1993) (discussing importance
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maintain that their individual perceptions of justice and fairness, as well as the
background experiences that helped shape those perceptions, will influence their own
reasoning and contribute to the dynamic of deliberation among colleagues.
Thus, for example, some judges advocate a specific role for the value of
compassion in good judging, by urging more expansive interpretation of
"compassionate" statutory standards such as those that suspend deportation in cases
of "extreme hardship" or that prohibit discrimination against employees based on
certain immutable personal characteristics. 59 Other judges have stated that their
personal backgrounds and experiences affect how they decide cases,60 and that they
are at times influenced by the experiences of fellow judges as part of collective
decisionnaking.61 One of the judicial presenters at this Symposium has invoked
Cardozo to describe the medley of attributes and exposures among appellate judges as
fostering a "balance of eccentricities" that helps generate more reliable legal
standards. 62
The bipartisan interest in increased diversity on the federal bench is a further
indication that individual values are perceived as contributing in important respects to
judicial decisionmaking. Presidents from both parties and leaders of the bar have
advocated the inclusion of more female and minority judges on federal courts as
enhancing the quality of the judicial work product.63 Greater diversity enables judges
of precedents and principled decisionmaking in protecting judiciary against charges of being
arbitrary, irrational, and personal).
59 See Mary M. Schroeder, Compassion on Appeal, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 45,49-51 (1990); see
also Stephen Reinhardt, Dialogue: Good Judging, 2 GREEN BAG 2d 299, 301-02 (1999)
(advocating compassionate consideration in individual cases). Apart from the "liberal" value of
compassion, more "conservative" values like efficiency have also been ascribed to judicial
decisionmaking in some settings. See generally RiCHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 123-26
(1995); Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate
Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 251, 318-19 (1997).
60 See Reinhardt, supra note 59, at 302 (discussing how the experience ofgrowing up Jewish
during time of widespread anti-Semitism contributed to his sensitivity toward rights of minorities
and underprivileged people); Patricia M. Wald, Essay: Thoughts on Decisionmal'ng, 87 W. VA. L.
REV. 1, 12 (1984) (discussing how each judge's personal background, experiences, and former
involvements are part of her intellectual capital that is "bound to influence [her] notions of how a
case should be decided").
61 See Sandra Day O'Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence ofa Raconteur, 44 STAN.
L. REV. 1217, 1217 (1992) (reporting that Justice Marshall's presence as a colleague and friend
"profoundly influence[d]" her); Reinhardt, supra note 59, at 302 (referring to impact that African
American judges on Ninth Circuit have had on their colleagues' view of the law).
62 See Abrahamson, supra note 58, at 985 (quoting with approval CARIOZO, supra note 56,
at 177: "The eccentricities ofjudges balance one another [and] out of the attrition of diverse minds
is beaten something which has a consistency and uniformity and average value greater than its
component elements.").
63 See President Clinton, Remarks to the American BarAssociation, Aug. 9, 1999, reprinted
in 35 WKLY. COMI. PREs. Doc. 1600 (arguing that his appointments to the federal bench are the
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to "amplify and flush out areas of rational disagreement" when applying legal rules, it
enhances their understanding about the "subtle influences of race, ethnicity or
gender," and it "enrich[es] the judicial conversation by adding less familiar points of
view."64 Such diversity also is seen as likely to improve the public's perception ofthe
courts, by increasing the confidence of female and minority litigants, jurors, and
attorneys in the basic fairness and legitimacy of the legal system.65 The continuing
emphasis on diversity reflects an appreciation that judges with contrasting personal
backgrounds and experiences will express and reflect those perspectives during
collegial decisionmaking that ultimately yields a stronger and more respected set of
legal rules.
Finally, quite apart from the perceptions of political leaders, practicing attorneys,
and judges themselves, scholars studying judicial behavior have long maintained that
personal background factors have a demonstrable impact on the decisionmaking
process. In particular, social scientists and law professors hypothesize that pre-court
life experiences play a prominent role in shaping the individual values and policy
most diverse ever and have garnered the strongest ABA ratings of any president's in nearly forty
years thereby "shatter[ing] the destructive myth that diversity and quality do not go hand in hand");
Scott Shepard, On the Issues, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Mar. 10, 1992, at A ll (reporting President
Bush's urging that Senate Republicans "seek out qualified women and minority candidates" for the
federal bench, and candidate Clinton's belief that "our nation is best served by aj udiciary which is
representative of the great diversity that comprises our country."); H.T. Smith, Toward a More
Diverse Judiciary, A.B.A. J., July 1995, at 8 (discussing ABA's recent passage of a resolution
encouraging the appointment of people of color to the judiciary, and reporting National Bar
Association President's statement that "[a] more diverse judiciary will minimize prejudice and
insensitivity from judges, and engender more respect from the public"); see also Lynn Hecht
Schafran, At Issue: Supreme Court Nominees: Should Race and Gender be Factors in Choosing
Justices?, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1991, at 8 (reporting Justice Brennan's statement that "there should be
'diversity in manyrespects' on the Court, including geography, politics, race, gender, and religion,"
and adding "[t]hese are all segments of our pluralistic society, and I think people are a little more
comfortable when they see a broadly representative group. It is more than a symbol. People bring
different experiences and insights to their work.").
64 Report of the Working Committees to the Second Circuit Task Force on Gender, Racial
and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts, 1997 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 124, 180-81 [hereinafter Second
Circuit Report]; see Theresa M. Beiner, What Will Diversity on the Bench Mean for Justice?, 6
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 113, 150 (1999) (contending that diversity increases the prospect that
judges will be able to see and assess the differing perspectives of the many parties to federal
litigation).
65 See Second Circuit Report, supra note 64, at 179-80; see also The Effects of Gender in the
Federal Courts: The Final Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, 67 S. CAL. L.
REv. 745,784 (1994) (reporting that 58% of femalejudges and 65% of female lawyers surveyed
believe the male-dominated bench in the Ninth Circuit favored male practitioners, whereas 9% of
male judges and 14% of male attorneys shared that belief).
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preferences of judges, and that such biographical factors can be useful in predicting
judicial decisions. 66
There is notably less supporting evidence on this score than exists with respect to
prior political affiliation.67 It may be that personal attributes and experiences have
been studied less intensively than political background. For instance, certain personal
attributes, such as being female or black, may not yet have occurred with sufficient
frequency among federal judges to allow for in-depth empirical analysis over
extended time periods.68 In addition, some of these non-political factors are more
difficult to analyze in quantitative terms. Certain aspects of pre-judicial experience,
such as having held elected office, may at times be too heterogeneous or complex to
be classifiable for substantive law purposes. 69
Still, the relatively soft evidence regarding the predictive value of social
background factors does not mean such evidence is nonexistent. A number of studies
have shown a significant association between judicial voting patterns and certain
personal or professional background factors, including gender,70 race, 71
66 See, e.g., Jilda M. Aliotta, Combining Judges 'Attributes and Case Characteristics: An
Alternative Approach to Explaining Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 71 JUDICATURE 277 (1988);
Sisk et al., supra note 43; C. Neal Tate & Roger Handburg, Time Binding and Theory Building in
Personal Attribute Models ofSupreme Court Voting Behavior, 1916-88,35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 460
(1991).
67 See George, supra note 41, at 16-31 (reviewing research studying the possible influence on
judicial behavior of various personal attributes and social background factors).
68 Only eight females had ever been appointed to the federal bench at the circuit or district
court levels before 1977. See Amy Singer, Numbers Too Big to Ignore, AM. LAw., Mar. 1999, at 5,
6. By 1992, there were 68 female district court judges and by 2001 that number had increased to
130. Similarly, the number of female appellate courtjudges rose to 22 in 1992 and to 35 in 2001.
The number of African American federal district judges was 34 in 1992 and 71 in 2001; the
number of African American appellatejudges was 9 in 1992 and 12 in 2001. See Goldman et al.,
supra note 13, at 250.
69 See, e.g., Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 55, at 589-90 (reporting that elected office
experience was associated in divergent ways with the voting patterns of regular appellate judges
and designated district courtjudges, and suggesting that differing nature ofthe elected offices held
by these two groups ofjudges may help account for the divergence).
70 See Brudney, Schiavoni & Merritt, supra note 43, at 1756 (finding that female Republican
appointees to appellate bench were significantly more likely to support the union's legal position
than their male Republican colleagues); Nancy E. Crowe, Gender and the Courts: A Look at the
Diversification of the Federal Bench (1997) (unpublished paper delivered at Conference on the
Scientific Study of Judicial Politics) (on file with author) (finding that female appellate court
judges were significantly more likely to vote for plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases than male
judges); Sue Davis et al., Voting Behavior and Gender on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 77
JUDICATURE 129, 131-32 (1993) (finding that female appellate court judges were significantly
more supportive of employment discrimination claimants than their male counterparts, although no
significant gender-related differences were found in obscenity or criminal procedure cases).
71 See, e.g., Jon Gottschall, Carter's Judicial Appointments: The Influence of Affirmative
Action and Merit Selection on Voting on the US Courts ofAppeals, 67 JUDICATURE 165, 172-73
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religion,72 age,73 status of college or law school attended, 74 experience as a law
professor,75 experience in elected office,76 and experience as a prosecutor.77
(1983) (reporting that black Carter appointees voted for criminal accused and for prisoners 79% of
the time compared to 53% by white Carter appointees); Susan Welch et al., Do Black Judges Make
a Difference?, 32 AM. J. POL. SC. 126,407 (1988) (analyzing a northeastern city's criminal court,
and concluding that "in the crucial decision to incarcerate, having more black judges increases
equality of treatment").
72 See, e.g., FRANK J. SORAUF, THE WALL OF SEPARATION: THE CONSTrIUIONALPOLMCS OF
CHURCH AND STATE 206-20 (1976) (examining appellate and trial court decisions addressed to
separation of church and state, and finding that Jewish and Catholic judges differ significantly in
their approaches); Brudney, Schiavoni & Merritt, supra note 43, at 1754 (examining appellate
court decisions addressed to labor-management relations, and finding that Catholic and Jewish
judges were significantly more likely than their colleagues to favor unions in certain areas);
Kenneth N. Vines, Federal District Judges and Race Relations Cases in the South,26 J. POL 337,
353 (1964) (examining district court decisions on race relations, and finding significant differences
between Catholics and "orthodox Protestants").
73 See Brudney, Schiavoni & Merritt, supra note 43, at 1754 n.238 (finding that older
appellate court judges were more likely to rule against the union on certain types of labor relations
issues); Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts ofAppeals Revisited, 69
AM. POL. Sci. REV. 491,499 (1975) (finding that older appellate courtjudges were more likely to
favor conservative (pro-employer) outcomes in labor cases and to rule conservatively in a number
of other areas).
74 See Brudney, Schiavoni & Merritt, supra note 43, at 1750-51 (finding that judges who
attended more elite colleges were significantly more likely to reject the union's legal position);
Stuart S. Nagel, Multiple Correlation of Judicial Backgrounds and Decisions, 2 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 258,267,270 (1974) (finding thatjudges who attended low-tuition law schools (as opposed
to high-tuition schools) were more likely to favor prosecution over defense in criminal cases); C.
Neal Tate, Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court Justices:
Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics Decisions, 1946-1978,75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355,
363 (1981) (finding that justices who attended more prestigious colleges were more likely to
support liberal outcomes in cases involving economic regulation).
75 See George, supra note 41, at 39-59 (finding that academic judges appointed by more
ideologically-oriented presidents-FDR and Reagan-were among the most consistently
ideological of all appellate judges, and that academics on federal bench generally publish more
majority opinions, and exert more innovative influence on the law, than their non-academic
counterparts).
76 See Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, Neo-Institutionalism and Dissent in State Supreme
Courts, 52 J. POL. 54, 57-58 (1990) (identifying a connection between elected office experience
and a propensity to vote with the majority on an appellate court); S. Sidney Ulmer, Dissent
Behavior and the Social Background of Supreme Court Justices, 32 J. POL. 580,588, 597 (1970)
(same); Brudney, Schiavoni & Merritt, supra note 43, at 1753 (finding that appellate judges who
had held elected office before joining the bench were more likelyto support union legal positions
than their counterparts who lacked this experience); Tate, supra note 74, at 363 (finding that
justices who had held elected office were more liberal on economic regulation questions).
77 See, e.g., Richard E. Johnston, Supreme Court Voting Behavior. A Comparison of the
Warren and Burger Courts, in CASES IN AMERICAN POLITICS 108-09 (Robert L. Peabody ed.,
1976) (finding thatjustices with prior prosecutorial experience were more conservative in criminal
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Moreover, it seems reasonable to anticipate that as the federal judiciary continues to
become more diverse, these and other social background factors will assume a
stronger role as indicators of judicial voting behavior.78
Once again, it is possible to view the influence of a judge's personal or
professional background as a threat to judicial independence in that it detracts from
our dominant lawyerly paradigm of judicial decisionmaking as the reasoned
elaboration of more or less objectively discemible doctrine and values. 79 As is the
case with political affiliation, however, the relationship between objective legal rules
and subjective pre-judicial experiences reflects synergy as well as conflict. A second
empirical example illustrates how certain professional experiences may serve to
deepen judicial appreciation for doctrine in ways that help shape the reasoned
elaboration and application of legal rules.
In a separate analysis of the 1100-plus labor-management relations cases
described earlier,80 my co-authors and I found that the thirty-four appellate court
judges who had represented management in National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)81
matters before joining the bench were significantly more likely to support union legal
positions in the courts of appeals than their colleagues. 82 In other words, judges with
management-side experience were more likely to vote against the interests of their
former clients than were their counterparts, almost all of whom were judges with no
NLRA experience of any kind.83
Our explanation for this intriguing set of findings invoked the distinctive nature
of collectivist and anti-competitive policies underlying the NLRA--policies that have
become increasingly anomalous in a legal culture heavily oriented toward individual
procedure and economic regulation cases); Nagel, supra note 74, at 266-67 (finding that judges
with prosecutorial experience were more likely to support the prosecution's position).
78 See Patricia M. Wald, A Response to Tiller and Cross, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 235,252 n.65
(1999) (expressing this belief).
79 See, e.g., Abrahamson, supra note 58, at 982-88; David L. Shapiro, In Defense ofJudicial
Candor, 100 HARv. L. REv. 731,737 (1987).
80 See Brudney, Schiavoni & Merritt, supra note 43, at 1697. My co-authors and I utilized as
the unit of measurement for our study the issue rather than the case as a whole: each judicial
participation consisted of an individual judge's vote for or against the union's legal position on a
single issue in a case appealed from the Labor Board. See id. at 1699-700.
81 National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994)).
82 See Brudney, Schiavoni & Merritt, supra note 43, at 1741-48 for a full discussion and
analysis of these findings.
83 Our findings were especially robust when the judges who had represented management
also had extensive and varied NLRA experience. Typically, these judges spent a considerable
amount of time (five to twenty years) with a private firm in which an important part of their
practice involved labor relations work. Their acquisition of NLRA experience in govemment or
academic settings generally occurred over a much shorter time period, either at the start of their
career or after a number of years in private practice.
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rights and the free market. We suggested that pre-judicial familiarity with the Act had
bred greater judicial respect for its protective doctrinal scope, even though the
familiarity was developed while protecting employer interests. 84 Attorneys who have
performed substantial work representing management before the Labor Board and the
courts come to understand the NLRA's practical realities and its now-unusual, albeit
modest, policy goals.85 These attorneys apparently are better prepared to breathe life
into the Act's purposes and priorities when interpreting its legal rules once they are
separated from a client-based, ideological perspective. 86 In this setting, social
background factors enhance the traditional legal process model of judicial
decisionmaking. Special familiarity with a statute's purposes, generated by personal
background, helps to create or refine doctrinal understanding. 87
In sum, the ideal of judges applying legal rules through a neutral and wholly
impersonal reasoning process is just that-an ideal. The fact that our aspirational
view of judicial independence fails to contemplate a role for political and personal
background factors does not mean we should ignore or minimize the role those
factors actually play. We would do better to recognize as descriptively accurate the
contention that judges may be predictably influenced in various ways by their pre-
judicial experiences and then treat that subject as an appropriate focus for increased
scholarly and public attention. Insofar as prior political affiliation is associated on
84 Id. at 1742-45. We considered the alternative hypothesis that "client skepticism" (derived
from participating in strategic appeals of doubtful merit) better explained our robustly significant
findings, but rejected it for several reasons, including the fact that the very small number of former
union attomeys on the appellate bench were also more supportive of some union claims than other
judges. See id. at 1747-48.
85 It is particularly noteworthy that the pro-union effect of management-side experience was
significant for the subcategory of claims that involved misconduct by employers in the course of
negotiations with a recognized union. See id. at 1725 tbl.V, 1726-27. Those claims raise issues that
are at once closely tied to collective bargaining and distinctly at odds with the individual rights
orientation of contemporary legal culture. Accordingly, it seems reasonable to infer that judges
familiar with the unusual nature of policy objectives promoting the collective bargaining process
are especially prepared to support the union's position on such bargaining-related claims. See id. at
1762.
86 We also considered a slightly different version of this hypothesis-that judges with
management experience were "captured" by the Act based on their years of litigation before the
Board, because their own private practice thrived when the Act was energetically enforced, and
they inevitably developed a more expansive attitude toward the Act's protections. We concluded,
however, that this "capture" hypothesis was merely a variation of our "familiarity breeds respect"
hypothesis. See id. at 1745, n.21 1.
87 We.suggest that this "personal familiarity breeds respect" hypothesis may apply to other
areas of relatively specialized law, notably the performance of federal circuitjudges in patent law
cases. See Brudney, Schiavoni & Merritt, supra note 43, at 1748-50 and sources cited therein. One
modest practical consequence of such findings could be to encourage more sophisticated training
on specialized older statutes for sittingjudges who lack personal familiarity or prior exposure. See
id. at 1764.
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average with a tendency to construe certain legal rules generously or restrictively, this
reflects in part the impact of the politically accountable branches in shaping the broad
contours ofjudicial performance. To the extent that distinctive personal attributes or
professional experiences also affect judicial voting patterns, they too contribute-in
often subtle ways-to doctrinal development through both individual and collective
decisionmaking.
Two important purposes may be served by encouraging recognition of how
judges' political and personal backgrounds help shape the direction of federal law.
First, such recognition will make the legal community and the interested public more
attentive to the ways in which development of substantive law deviates from our
normative ideal. This increased awareness should in turn enable parties and their
advocates to become more sophisticated participants in the judicial enterprise. It may
also enable judges to become more cognizant in determining how best to appreciate,
subordinate, or harness the various influences associated with their own background
experiences and individual values.
Publicizing specific aspects of these departures from our normative ideal may
also serve a second purpose: helping to make the departures themselves more even-
handed. In this regard, diversity on the federal bench is important not because we
want women, minorities, or former management-side lawyers to approach doctrinal
matters in identifiably different ways, but because judges with distinctive
backgrounds may well approach certain matters from different vantage points
whether we want them to or not. Through appropriately tempered disclosure of such
realities, we may encourage a more balanced, if not tolerant, public and political
attitude toward the judicial selection process.
As techniques and methods for studying judicial behavior become more
sensitive, the body of evidence indicating that judges are in some sense "influenced"
by political and personal background factors seems likely to grow. At the same time,
there will continue to be concerns that emphasis on the role played by such factors
may threaten the courts' legitimacy by undermining traditional perceptions ofjudges
as impartially applying law to facts. Whether the American public actually relies on or
requires such perceptions in order to maintain respect for the judiciary as an
independent institution is a separate question beyond the scope of this article,
although it is not clear that the public thinks about federal courts in these terms.88 But
given that political and personal influences on a judge's habits of thinking create
88 See, e.g., PERETrn, supra note 10, at 163-77 (criticizing from empirical standpoint the
conventional wisdom that public support for the Supreme Court reflects a perception of that
institution as exalted or impartial); Gregory A. Caldeira, Neither the Purse Nor the Sword:
Dynamics of Public Confidence in the Supreme Court, 80 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 1209, 1223-24
(1986) (concluding that public support for the Court as an institution depends on cumulative
agreement with specific public policies vindicated in its decisions, which changes over time, and
that "dynamics of aggregate support for the Court bear a remarkable resemblance to those for
Congress and the presidency").
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some tension with traditional doctrinally-based notions aboutjudicial independence, it
is useful to be recalibrating those notions.
If. THE CONSTRAINTS OF LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT
In addition to the impact of personal and political background, the independence
ofjudicial actors also may be affected by the interpretive methodologies these actors
bring to their decisionmaking. It is worth considering, at least provisionally, how
different interpretive approaches may enable judges to be more, or less, independent
when applying the laws that Congress has enacted.
A. Statutory Interpretation and Judicial Dependence
The principal focus of federal courts today is the interpretation of federal statutes.
I refer especially to the comprehensive regulatory schemes that impose a durable
network of rules and standards in a particular subject matter area, often administered
in part by a federal agency with stipulated enforcement powers.89 When these statutes
threaten the constitutional rights of individuals or arguably impinge on the
constitutional powers and prerogatives of the states, federal courts are expected to
exercise independent judgment to resolve the consequent disputes.90 Assuming,
however, that there is no need to review the constitutionality of a given
comprehensive statute or any of its provisions, the designated judicial role is the more
dependent task of applying faithfully the law Congress has enacted, i.e.,
implementing the Article I authority exercised by the legislative branch.
Members of Congress from both sides of the aisle insist regularly, and with
rhetorical flourish, that the function ofjudges is to interpret the law rather than create
it.91 The notion that judges are confined by the statute, and obligated to implement its
89 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, Food, Drug & Cosmetics Act, Securities Acts of
1933 and 1934, Title VII of Civil Rights Act, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, NLRA, Fair
Labor Standards Act. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-statutes, 50
DuKE L.J. 1215 (2001). My conception of a comprehensive regulatory statute differs from the
Eskridge and Ferejohn "super-statute" in certain respects.
90 See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); Legal Servs. Corp.
v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 545 (2001); Martin H. Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic
Theory and the Legislative Process: Mourning the Death of Originalism in Statutory
Interpretation, 68 TiE. L. REV. 803, 851 (1994).
91 See, e.g., 2001 Hearing, supra note 36 (statement of Sen. Hatch):
The role of federal judges is, quite simply, to apply the written law, be it the Constitution or
enacted legislation, to the case before them. But when federal judges deviate from the written
law, and decide cases based on their own policy preferences or views of what is just or right,
they in effect make up laws of their own despite the lack of legitimate authority for doing so.
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true meaning, constitutes an important limitation placed on judicial independence.
This limitation relates to the risk that too much independence in the statutory
interpretation arena transforms judges into policymakers, a role that is deemed suspect
under our separation-of-powers scheme when Congress has spoken. We want federal
judges to be independent in applying a statute consistently over time and without
regard to the privilege or stature of parties who appear before them. At the same time,
we fear the possibility that judges will "bend statutes to reflect their own political
preferences," 92 for we have concerns that such preferences may well be at odds with
the political choices reflected in the statutory text.
Of course, "interpreting the law" is not as simple as it sounds. Because statutory
language is often imprecise or inconclusive, and the circumstances of its application
often unanticipated or unforeseeable by its authors, judges inevitably engage in
something beyond mere logical deduction when construing a statute's verbal
formulations. In this setting, several theoretical frameworks have emerged with
respect to how best to perform the relatively dependent judicial role of achieving
fidelity to congressionally enacted law.
For present purposes, I refer to three dominant approaches. The first, textualism,
focuses almost exclusively on the words Congress has enacted, relying on ordinary
usage, dictionary definitions, canons of construction, and harmonization with similar
language in other laws or in other provisions of the same statute.93 The second
approach, dynamic interpretation, recognizes the primacy of the text, but suggests that
when faced with ambiguous or unclear language, courts should be willing to apply
statutes dynamically, rendering the statute effective by taking account of
contemporary problems and circumstances including post-enactment changes in
See also, e.g., 140 CONG. REC. 18,675 (1994) (statement of Sen. Thurmond) (quoting with
enthusiasm Judge Breyer's statement at his Supreme Court nomination hearing that "[a] judge
should... try to remember that what he is trying to do is interpret the law that applies to everyone,
not enunciate a subjective belief or preference"); Nomination of David Souter to be Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101 st Cong. 29 (1990) (statement of Sen. DeConcini) (expressing hope that he will find
Supreme Court nominee Judge Souter to be "ajurist who is respectful of precedent, rather than a
jurist who is on a mission to impose his personal beliefs or hidden agenda on the country through
the broad, sweeping opinions that he may write"); Nomination ofRobert H. Bork to be Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court ofthe United States: Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Comm.,
I 00th Cong. 667-68 (1987) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (expressing deep concern that nominee
would "uproot decades of settled law in order to write his own ideology into law").
92 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory Interpretation, 66
U. Cri. L. REv. 671,678 (1999).
9 3 See, e.g., ANTONIN ScAuA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW (1997); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains, 50 U. Ci. L. REv. 533 (1983). For an
example of textualism deftly applied by the Court, see West Virginia University Hospitals v. Casey,
499 U.S. 83, 88-101 (1991) (majority opinion by Justice Scalia).
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societal, political, and legal conditions.94 Finally, intentionalism, like dynamic
interpretation, is committed to the primacy of lext, but in the face of linguistic
uncertainty it seeks to resolve the interpretive question at hand based on evidence of
the enacting Congress's intent regarding that question, or to discover the
interpretation that best furthers the original purposes of the legislation. 95
Federal courts generally can be seen as applying a complex amalgam of all three
approaches when deciding particular cases,96 although certain individual judges have
effectively embraced textualism or intentionalism in their opinion-writing.97 My focus
here is not in addressing the spirited, ongoing debate among judicial and scholarly
advocates for these competing theories of statutory interpretation. Rather, I seek to
explore how the ideal of encouraging relative judicial dependence in the statutory
interpretation arena may be strengthened, or diluted, under each of these theories.
Bearing in mind the comprehensive federal regulatory schemes that dominate our
current statutory landscape, it is worth examining the extent to which textualism,
dynamic interpretation, and intentionalism suggest differing perspectives on the role
of an independent judiciary.
B. Textualism and Indifference Toward Legislative Purpose
Initially, textualism seems a straightforwardly dependent approach to statutory
interpretation. Congress as a body approves only the language contained in House
and Senate bills. By eschewing reliance on the unenacted intentions voiced by various
individuals or subgroups within both chambers, textualists maintain that they are
94 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 313-54 (1986); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479 (1987).
9 5 See, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF THE LAW 1111-383 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); Richard Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and in
the Courtroom, 50 U. Cif. L. REv. 800, 817-22 (1983).
96 See, e.g., W. Va. Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991) (Scalia's majority opinion
relies on textualism, while Stevens' dissent relies on intentionalism); Green v. Bock Laundry
Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989) (Stevens' majority opinion relies on intentionalism, while Scalia's
concurrence relies on textualism); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (Brennan's
majority opinion and Rehnquist's dissent rely heavily on intentionalism, while Blackmun's
concurrence relies on a dynamic interpretive approach).
97 On the current Supreme Court, Justices Scalia and Thomas are known for embracing
textualism while Justices Stevens and Breyer are generally advocates of intentionalism. Federal
judges are reluctant to endorse openly the dynamic interpretation approach, presumably because
they are uncomfortable playing such an explicitly creative role in the arena of statutory
construction. But cf Weber, 443 U.S. at 209 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (invoking "considerations,
practical and equitable, only partially perceived, if perceived at all, by the 88th Congress," tojustify
support for voluntary affirmative action plans under Title VII).
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being properly respectful of Congress's lawmaking supremacy. 98 Such deference to
the legislative text is most likely to occur when a statute's meaning is relatively
clear-to both the affected public and the courts. In that setting, textualists argue
persuasively that their approach fosters an optimal measure of judicial dependence.
As suggested earlier, however, statutory language as a form of communication is
not always this clear. When interpretative discretion and judgment are required to
decipher inconclusive terms, phrases, or provisions, textualists in effect advocate that
judges act as sophisticated linguistic technicians. 99 In parsing the words of the statute
and applying language-related rules and conventions, textualists dismiss the
legislative process as a resource to help resolve uncertain statutory meaning. That
dismissiveness seems to extend the scope of judicial independence in two respects.
First, it excludes potentially probative evidence generated by the legislative branch,
provided one accepts that Congress as an institution tends to act purposively and that
legislation is likely to reflect the majority's preferences and sentiments much of the
time.)00 In addition, by relying on the essentially apolitical logic of linguistic analysis,
textualists in effect declare their indifference to the policy-related consequences of
their interpretive decisions.101 Given that Congress enacts laws in order to create
policy-related consequences, this level of indifference signifies a further expression of
judicial independence from the legislative branch.
Textualists often respond by pointing to the even more independent alternatives,
contending that courts charged with explicating inconclusive language should prefer
interpretive tools that are less susceptible to misunderstanding or misuse in the hands
of naive or result-oriented judges. Principled application of such relatively benign
98 See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371,376
(1987). See generally WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STArUTEs IN CouRT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF
STATUrTORY INTERPRETATION 157-58 (1999).
99 See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future ofthe Chevron Doctrine, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 371-73 (1994); George H. Taylor, Structural Textualism, 75 B.U. L. REV.
321,341-46 (1995).
100 There is a good deal of scholarship questioning whether it is possible to discern a
"purpose" to congressional enactments. See generally Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey,
Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 426-29, 438-45 (1988); John F.
Manning, Legal Realism and the Canons'Revival, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 283,289-91 (2002). I have
joined that debate on other occasions, and will not re-enter here. See generally James J. Brudney,
Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretation of Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling
Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1,47-56 (1994). 1 rely, however, on what remains a dominant, ifnot
prevailing, view that the legislative process possesses a baseline measure of coherence, i.e., that
legislators who agree a certain text should become law are generally able to achieve a broadly
shared understanding of the purpose(s) that triggered enactment and often a similar understanding
as to the meaning and implications of certain specific provisions. See generally Posner, supra note
42, at 195-96; Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.
636, 649 (1999).
101 See generally Easterbrook, supra note 93, at 547-52.
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tools, the argument continues, will confine judges more effectively to the legislative
substance that Congress enacted.102 Yet, assuming arguendo the desirability of
contextual approaches that are less likely to be misunderstood or misused by the
average federal judge, the choice between historical and linguistic context is not a
clear one.
Legislative history can at times be unreliable as an aid to understanding
ambiguous text. Its conditions of production-featuring more secrecy and less
accountability than the production of text-allow for the possibility of strategic
behavior by legislative staff and lobbyists.' 0 3 Moreover, the proliferation of legislative
history materials enables judges to rely on certain parts of the legislative record and
ignore others in ways that may seem incoherent or manipulative 104
Linguistic context, however, offers analogous potential for judicial
misunderstanding and misuse. Dictionaries regularly contain multiple definitions for a
word, and priority of usage may vary from one dictionary to another or from one
historic period to another. 105 Similarly, canons of construction tend to be framed as
presumptions about the way language or some extrinsic source of authority should
102 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation,
17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 63 (1994) (emphasizing that "political society wishes to ...
confine judges" and that "[h]aving a wide field to play-rnot only the statute but also the debates,
not only the rules but also the values they advance.. .- liberates judges. This is objectionable on
grounds of... predictability."); see also Richard J. Lazarus & Claudia M. Newman, City of
Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund: Searching for Plain Meaning in Unambiguous
Ambiguity, 4 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1,23 (1995) (suggesting that the textualist approach may inure to
the benefit of environmental groups because "[t]he literal language of most environmental statutes
tends to be extraordinarily aspirational and unforgiving in its application").
103 See, e.g., Starr, supra note 98, at 376-77; Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98-99
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
104 Judge Leventhal lampooned this tendency by referring to legislative history as a way of
"looking over a crowd and picking out your friends," quoted in Patricia M. Wald, Some
Observations on the Use ofLegislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV.
195, 214 (1983). See also Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 21-22 (1990) [hereinafter Stat. Interp. Hrg.]
(statement of Judge James L. Buckley) (arguing that "ij]udges confined to the printed page and
occupying a world far removed from the pressure cooker life on Capitol Hill," cannot readily
distinguish between statements genuinely intended to enlighten or persuade colleagues and those
motivated by a desire to manipulate courts).
105 See Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress:
The United States Supreme Court's Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227, 264-83 (1999)
(criticizing the Court's inconsistent and at times incoherent reliance on dictionaries); Note, Looking
It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1444-49 (1994)
(same). In addition, courts at times decide to reject dictionary meaning and rely instead on the
common understanding of key statutory terms. See, e.g., Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304,307 (1893)
(concluding that tomatoes are "vegetables" and not "fruit" in tariff context).
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apply, subject to conditions or caveats that may neutralize the presumptions.' 0 6 This
contingent design has led to canons being famously paired with "counter canons,"
suggesting that judges have considerable freedom as to the canonical direction they
will follow in a particular case.107 Given the indeterminate aspects of dictionaries and
canons, it is hardly surprising that these language-related techniques have often been
applied in an almost adversarial manner by federal judges.10 8
In short, both historical and linguistic context are anecdotally unreliable as
guidance to the meaning of enacted texts, but there is no reason to view one set of
resources as more systematically unreliable than the other. Judge Richard Posner,
writing with characteristic understatement on this issue, has suggested that when
federal judges invoke a contextual resource to help explain inconclusive text, "the
irresponsible judge will twist any approach to yield the outcomes that he desires, and
the stupid judge will do the same thing unconsciously."',0 9
Apart from such unresolved considerations of reliability, a federal judge seems
more removed from the authority of the legislative branch when she addresses textual
ambiguities solely by reference to the dictionary or the canons of construction while
ignoring statements from key members of Congress on which legislative colleagues
may well have relied when casting their votes."10 The explanations offered in
committee reports or in bill managers' floor statements derive in constitutional terms
from Congress's own policymaking authority,"'1 and those explanations often
contribute meaningfully to members' understanding of statutory text. 11 2 There is less
10 6 See Eskridge, supra note 92, at 679.
107 See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory ofAppellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395,401-06 (1950).
108 For relatively recent examples at the Supreme Court level, see Muscarello v. United
States, 524 U.S. 125, 127-34, 139-40 (1998) (Justice Breyer duels with Justice Ginsburg on the
dictionary definition of the verb "carry"); Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177-78 (1993)
(Justice Blackmun disagrees with Justice Souter over the dictionary definition of the verb
"conduct"); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Oregon., 515 U.S. 687,
700-08, 715-25 (1995) (Justice Stevens' reliance on Whole Act Rule clashes with Justice Scalia's
emphasis on noscitur a sociis).
109 RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTs: CRIsIs AND REFORM 287 (1985).
110 See McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory
Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 738 (1992); Abner J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's
Observations, 1987 DuKE L.J. 380, 385-86.
111 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 ("Each House may determine the Rules of its
Proceedings .... "); U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 5, cl. 3 ("Each House shall keep a Journal of its
Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same .... ).
112 See, e.g., Abner J. Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 627,631
(1987) (former Congressman and D.C. Circuit Judge referring to committee report as the "bone
structure of the legislation ... the road map that explains why things are in and things are out of the
statute"); Joan Biskupic, Scalia Takes a Narrow View in Seeking Congress' Will, 48 CONG. Q.
913, 917 (1990) (relating Senator Specter's view that "members of Congress are more likely to
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reason to believe that Congress relies on, or is even aware of, formal linguistic sources
such as the canons or the dictionary unless Congress demonstrates this awareness in
legislative history. 113 Accordingly, invoking such sources to the exclusion of the
legislative record remains a statement of relative judicial autonomy.
We have already noted the importance of acknowledging the extent to which
judges are far more than impersonal implementers of legal rules and precedents.
Different judicial backgrounds, experiences, and values contribute-often
subconsciously but at times predictably-to the rule-of-law applications that shape
doctrinal development. It is also worth considering whether different analytic
approaches have a predictable influence on the substantive direction of the law.
Specifically, might reliance on certain types of contextual sources to discem statutory
meaning alter our view ofjudges as relatively subsidiary actors in this arena, thereby
affecting our understanding as to the balance of powers between federal courts and
Congress?114
read a committee report than the bill itself. The prose of a report is easier to understand, and,
because a bill usually amends an existing statute, it is impossible to follow without referring to the
U.S. Code."); Stat. Interp. Hrg., supra note 104, at 21 (statement of Judge James L. Buckley)
("[M]y understanding of most of the legislation I voted on [while a U.S. Senator] was based
entirely on my reading of its language and, where necessary, on explanations contained in the
[committee] report."). See generally Bank One Chi., N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S.
264, 276 (1996) (Stevens, J., concurring) (observing that "[l]egislators, like other busy people,
often depend on thejudgment of trusted colleagues when discharging their official responsibilities"
and that "if a statute... has bipartisan support and has been carefully considered by committees
familiar with the subject matter, Representatives and Senators may appropriatelyrely on the views
of the committee members in casting their votes").
113 Reliance on the judicially constructed canons is especially problematic because it is not
clear that Congress, with its steadily declining proportion of lawyer-members, has any serious
awareness of their existence, much less their specific applicability. See NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN ET
AL., VrrAL STA'nSTICs ON CONGRESS, 1999-2000, at 20-21,26-27 (2000) (reporting that number
of senators who are trained as lawyers has decreased from 68 in 1967 to 55 in 1999, and number of
representatives who are lawyers has declined from 246 in 1967 to 163 in 1999). Judge Mikva
suggested, with a trace of sarcasm, that during his extended tenure in the House, the "only'canons'
we talked about were the ones the Pentagon bought that could not shoot straight." Mikva, supra
note 112, at 629.
114 One admittedly laborious way of examining this empirical problem is to classify and
analyze judicial reasoning in a particular area of substantive law over an extended period of time.
In that regard, I am currently compiling a data base of the more than six hundred labor and
employment law cases decided by the Supreme Court during the Burger and Rehnquist Court eras.
By coding outcomes in relation to the different statutory schemes or constitutional provisions
involved, as well as thej udicial reasoning relied on in each opinion, I hope to be able to discuss the
extent to which certain sources of interpretation-such as dictionaries, linguistic and substantive
canons, legislative history, Supreme Court precedent, and agency deference-are more heavily
used than others, or are more outcome-related in this area of law when used by certain justices or
during certain time periods.
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In that regard, research addressing the recent record of relations between
Congress and the Supreme Court on statutory interpretation decisions yields some
intriguing results. The Court since the early 1980s has placed greater reliance on
dictionary definitions 115 and the canons of construction, 116 and less reliance on
legislative history, 117 when interpreting statutes. A number of these textualist
decisions triggered sharp responses from a liberal Congress influenced or controlled
by the Democratic Party. Many well-publicized overrides of statutory interpretation
rulings in the 1980s and early 1990s reversed decisions in which the Court had relied
on plain meaning or on the canons of construction. 118 Congressional frustration over
the Court's approach is further suggested by the higher percentage of overrides in this
115 See David 0. Stewart, By the Book: Looking Up the Law in the Dictionary, A.B.A. J.,
July 1993, at 46, 46-47 (reporting thatjustices recited dictionary definitions of key phrases fifty-
four times in thirty-eight cases between Jan. 1, 1992 and May 17, 1993, compared to only four
cases in 1951 and 1952); Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Remains a
Fortress: An Update, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 51, 51-52 (2001) (reporting that the Court in the 1990s
cited to dictionaries in over two hundred opinions, nearly half the total number of opinions
referring to dictionaries in Supreme Court history).
116 See generally Stat. Interp. Hrg., supra note 104, at 83 (statement of Prof. William N.
Eskridge, Jr.); Joseph Henry Bates, Symposium Introduction: A Reevaluation of the Canons of
Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND. L. REv. 529, 530 (1992); Manning, supra note 100, at 289.
117 See Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court's Declining Reliance on Legislative History:
The Impact of Justice Scalia's Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369, 384-95 (1999) (reporting
decline in use of legislative history in Supreme Court opinions since 1980, especially opinions
authored by more conservative justices); Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative
History in the Supreme Court, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 205, 212-20 (reporting decline from 1987 to
1994); Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing
Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 277 (1990)
(reporting decline during the 1980s).
118 See, e.g., W. Va. Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991), overridden by Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 113, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (1991); Pub. Employees Ret. Sys.
of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989), overridden by Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985),
overridden by Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, § 1003, 100 Stat.
1807, 1845 (1986); Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984), overridden by Handicapped
Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (1986). See generally Daniel
J. Bussel, Textualism 's Failures: A Study of Ovetruled Bankruptcy Decisions, 53 VAND. L. REV.
887, 903-10 (2000) (finding that textualist decisions construing federal bankruptcy code are more
likely to be overridden than other bankruptcy decisions in period from 1978 to 1998); Eskridge,
supra note 35, at 347-48 (concluding that Congress is more likely to override "plain meaning"
decisions than any others, since nearlyhalf of the overrides since 1967 address decisions in which
the primary reasoning was plain-meaning or canons-of-construction reasoning, whereas overrides
of decisions based on statutory "purpose" are rare); Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, The
Next Word: Congressional Response to Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 65 TEMP. L. REV.
425, 448 (1992) (noting that a disproportionate number of decisions between 1968 and 1988 that
were overridden by Congress relied on a "plain meaning" analysis).
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period that occurred within a short time following the Court's decision. 119 It is
broadly consistent with this pattern of interactions that the Republican-controlled
Congresses in place since January 1995 appear less interested in pursuing overrides of
the Supreme Court's statutory interpretation decisions than were their liberal
Democratic predecessors. 120
Various commentators and dissenting Justices have suggested that the Court's
textualist approach seems inclined to thwart the will of Congress.121 One vivid, recent
example involves the decision in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams. 122 The Court in
Adams held that the Federal Arbitration Act's basic coverage provision-making
enforceable any arbitration clause addressed to a transaction "involving commerce"-
applied to the full extent of Congress's commerce clause powers, but that the Act's
exemption for employment contracts affecting seamen, railroad employees, or "any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" excluded only
workers in the transportation industries.123 In Justice Kennedy's majority opinion, the
119 See H.R. Rep. No. 102-40pt. I, at 23-81 (1991) (discussingten Supreme Court decisions
specifically targeted for override or modification by 1991 Civil Rights Act; seven of the ten had
been decided between 1989 and 1991); Eskridge, supra note 35, at 450-55 (reporting data on
overrides that indicate 62% of statutory overrides between 1987 and 1990 occurred within two
years of the Court's decision, whereas 44% of overrides between 1982 and 1986, and 32% of
overrides between 1967 and 1981, were within two years of the Court's decision).
120 My research assistant and I sought to follow Professor Eskridge's principal method of
tracking override legislation by relying on committee report discussion contained in U.S. Code
Congressional andAdministrative News (U.S.C.C.A.N.). See Eskridge, supra note 35, at 336-37
(discussing data collection). In the last three Congresses that Eskridge examined (99th through
101 st, 1985-1990), Congress passed 64 override statutes (21.3 per Congress), overriding atotal of
39 Supreme Court decisions (13 per Congress) and 72 lower court decisions (twenty-four per
Congress). Id. at 338. During the first two Congresses most recently under Republican control
(104th and 105th, 1995-1998), Congress passed 14 overide statutes (7 per Congress), overriding a
total of 7 Supreme Court decisions (3.5 per Congress) and 23 lower court decisions (11.5 per
Congress). Even allowing for a decrease in the overall number of laws passed in the two later
Congresses (and also the risk that exclusive reliance on U.S.C.C.A.N. may modestly understate the
number of override statutes), this contrast is striking. (Results for the 104th and 105th Congresses
are on file with author).
121 See, e.g., Steven R. Greenberger, Civil Rights and the Politics ofStatutory Interpretation,
62 U. CoLO. L. REv. 37 (1991); Wendy E. Parmet, Plain Meaning and Mitigating Measures:
Judicial Interpretations of the Meaning ofDisability, 21 BERKELEY J. EMp. & LAB. L. 53 (2000);
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dept. (if Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598,
622-23 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See generally Casey, 499 U.S. at 115 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("[W]e do the country a disservice when we -needlessly ignore persuasive evidence of
Congress' actual purpose and require it 'to take the time to revisit the matter' and to restate its
purpose in more precise English whenever its work product suffers from an omission or
inadvertent error.") (quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1031 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
122 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
123 Id. at 113-18.
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difference between the capacious meaning of "involving commerce" and the confined
meaning of "engaged in commerce" was deemed so self-evident that it was improper
even to consult the legislative record concerning the genesis of those two phrases.124
The dissent's reliance on legislative history to show that the enacting Congress
intended the exact opposite of what the Court accomplished 25 was brushed aside as
simply irrelevant to the Court's interpretive function.
The tension between a liberal Congress that manifests certain socially
redistributive purposes and a conservative federal judiciary that disregards such
purposes (and rejects the legislative record's evidence thereof) has distinctly historical
overtones reaching back to the New Deal, if not beyond.' 26 Contemporary judicial
suspicion regarding the relevance of legislative intent or purpose is often
accompanied by skeptical attitudes toward the values of the modem regulatory
state. 127 Such attitudes in turn may reflect the courts' reluctance to concede that
presumptions favoring private markets and private rights are not appropriate
background norms for the interpretation of regulatory statutes. 128
124 Id. at I 19.
125 See id. at 125-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (relying on "extensive and well documented"
legislative history to demonstrate that Congress plainly intended to exclude FAA application to
contracts of employment, in direct response to organized labor's concerns, while the majority
opinion endorses a policy that strongly favors private arbitration of these very same employment
disputes).
126 See Frederick J. de Sloovere, Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation ofStatutes, 88 U. PA. L.
REv. 527,539(1940):
If a statute means only what a court... wishes to think it means..., and if searching for
immediate legislative objectives in the internal history of the legislation and in conditions
surrounding its enactment is a misguided effort, then language techniques and juristic
conceptions become the sole bases for statutory interpretation of the future, and we find
ourselves back where we were a century ago in the judicial handling of legislation.
See also James M. Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation ", 43 HARv. L. REv. 886, 889-91
(1930) (suggesting that "[w]hen the intent or meaning of the legislature is discoverable [from the
legislative record], statutory interpretation posits no serious problem except the political one of
insistence upon judicial humility," and that "[t]he real difficulty is twofold: that strong judges
prefer to override the intent of the legislature in order to make law according to their own views,
and that barbaric rules of interpretation too often exclude the opportunity to get at legislative
meaning in realistic fashion"). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislative History Values,
66 CHi.-KENTL. REv. 365, 392-93 (1990) (noting that legislative history as evidence of statutory
purpose became a dominant theme after 1938).
127 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98
HARv. L. REv. 4,15-19 (1984) (emphasizing extent to which many modem laws are designed to
serve private rather than public interests). See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFrER THE RIGHTS
REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 6 (1990).
128 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 127, at 140-42.
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There is, however, nothing inevitably conservative about judicial reliance on
"language techniques"'129 or judicial refusal to consider legislative history and
purposes. Confronted with the task of interpreting laws enacted by a politically
conservative legislature, a textualist court could use such language techniques to
vindicate liberal ideological positions. That, in fact, is what appears to have occurred
in a number of South African appellate court decisions during the late 1980s,
narrowly construing emergency legislation enacted by the apartheid government.
Professor Stephen Ellmann has described in detail judicial responses to various
internal security and public safety laws enacted to restrict civil rights and civil liberties
in South Africa. 130 In a parliamentary regime that had no written constitution, South
African appellate courts lacked the power to invalidate duly promulgated national
statutes, 131 and their general tendency was, perhaps not surprisingly, to vindicate the
government's broad domestic security powers against claims brought by aggrieved
individuals. 132 In several instances, however, these appellate judges relied on
"ordinary meaning," canons of construction, and other text-related interpretive
conventions to limit the intrusive nature and obviously restrictive intent of the South
African laws. 133 By focusing on the language and structure of key statutory
provisions, the appellate court was able to overcome likely legislative purposes and
provide a measure of protection for individuals whose liberty and personal safety had
been compromised. Ellmann goes on to advocate reliance on such language-related
techniques as instruments ofjudicial control over statutory meaning, instruments that
129 de Sloovere, supra note 126, at 539.
130 See generally STEPHEN ELLMANN, IN A TIME OF TROUBLE: LAW AND LIBERTY IN SOUTH
AFRICA's STATE OF EMERGENCY (1992).
131 See LOURENS M DU PLEssis & AG DU PLESSIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAw 73-74 (2d ed.
1995) (discussing South African judiciary's subservient role during decades of apartheid
government).
132 See ELLMANN, supra note 130, at 64-71 (discussing Appellate Division's pattern of
decisions upholding government exercise of emergency powers in the 1980s); Lynn Berat,
Courting Justice: A Callfor Judicial Activism in a Tranforned South Africa, 37 ST. Louis U. L.J.
849, 850-51, 858-61 (1993) (criticizing Appellate Division's capitulation to rationale of
parliamentary supremacy from the late 1 950s to the early 1 990s).
133 See, e.g., Minister of Law & Order v. Mathebe, 1990 (1) SA 114, 116-23 (A) (relying on
close textual analysis and canons to invalidate two arrests that conflicted with the presumption
against exercise of extraterritorial powers by the arresting police force); Nkwentsha v. Minister of
Law & Order, 1988 (3) SA 99, 111-17 (AD) (relying on ordinary meaning analysis to hold that a
detainee could be brought to court to testify); Minister of Law & Order v. Hurley, 1986 (3) SA
568, 577-90 (AD) (relying on plain language analysis and clear statement canon to reject
government's argument that the court lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a person was
lawfully arrested and detained pursuant to 1982 Intemal Security Act, and to conclude that the
person here was not properly detained). See generally ELIIAtNN, supra note 130, at 50-54, 118-
28, 142-52 (describing Appellate Division's interpretive innovations in support of human rights in
these and other decisions).
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may be used to protect fundamental human rights in a repressive parliamentary
regime.134
In short, while textualism is inherently neither conservative nor liberal, it may
well foster a propensity to temper and even frustrate legislative expectations.
Exclusive reliance on linguistic context enables a court to discount evidence of any
shared purposes or understandings among the legislators who voted for the statute.
That level of judicial autonomy in statutory interpretation may be something we
choose to value in some circumstances. Demanding that Congress draft laws clearly
may at times yield less ambiguous and more broadly understandable texts,135
especially if one presumes a certain level of efficient competence in legislative
lawmaking and a certain attentive responsiveness to judicial pronouncements. 136
Inviting the judiciary to ignore legislative intent may also allow courts to protect
individual rights regarded as fundamental, particularly in a regime that lacks a written
constitution or other form of "higher" law capable of trumping statutory authority. If,
however, we prefer to promote these values by encouraging greater judicial
independence as part of the statutory interpretation process, we would do well to
acknowledge that preference and refine our current notion of federal courts as
dependent actors in the legislative arena.
C. Dynamic Interpretation and Updating of Legislative Purpose
Dynamic interpretation can also be viewed as furthering a dependent judicial
role, though in a somewhat less linear fashion than textualism. Proponents of the
dynamic approach observe that Congress as an institution does not expect the
meaning of its legislative products to be rigidly confined by the understandings or
circumstances surrounding their initial enactments. Often, text is not sufficiently clear
or specific, and original legislative assumptions have been overtaken by subsequent
political, economic, and legal developments. In these circumstances, courts should
seek to further the "meta-intent" of making federal statutes effective over time by
134 See id. at 47-53, 233,238-39 (describing courts' abilityto rely on the canon that statutes
are presumed not to alter the common law, which at the time was more protective of human rights
than many South African statutes).
135 See generally United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 344-46 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
136 See Sunstein, supra note 100, at 658-59 (suggesting that the formalist interpretive
approach emphasizing plain meaning works well in the U.K., where Parliament is highly
professionalized and responsive to judicial identification of"mistakes"). It has been pointed out
that the American system does not compare favorably in terms of either professionalization or
responsiveness to mistakes. See generally P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND
SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 104-12, 306-23 (1987).
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construing them to integrate most effectively with the contemporary legal and social
landscape. 137
This dynamic or forward-looking approach, the argument continues, renders the
courts appropriately dependent in that judges effectively defer to more recent
perspectives on statutory meaning adopted by the two democratically elected
branches. If, for instance, the executive branch agency primarily responsible for
statutory enforcement acts to readjust original legislative priorities so as to incorporate
new commercial or technological realities of the regulated marketplace, federal courts
may ratify this updating process by deferring to present expressions of administrative
expertise.138 Even if the Executive Branch is not involved, judicial updating roughly
tracks the political preferences of the contemporary Congress because that group of
legislators can be presumed to support the priorities and policies reflected in federally
adjudicated law.139 To the extent that federal courts misapprehend those priorities or
policies, Congress is in a position to respond with corrective overrides.
Although this type of current preferences "default" formally respects the
principles of democratic accountability, dynamic interpretation also elevates courts as
the primary exponents of such current understandings in the legal culture. By relying
on evolving political values and unanticipated social or economic changes, courts
will, at times, generate applications of a statute that depart dramatically from what the
enacting legislature would have contemplated or intended. The relatively open-ended
nature of this judicial updating gives rise to some concern regarding consistency and
objectivity in the application of statutes. More important for our purposes, reliance on
post-enactment changes in societal priorities or ideological directions can foster
judicial autonomy in two important respects.
First, post-enactment interpretive rulings often do not reinforce, or even comport
with, the purposes or policies embodied in the statute being interpreted. Courts
functioning "dynamically" will be inclined to elevate their own policy preferences at
the expense of Congress's previously enacted value structure. This is not simply
because dynamic interpreters prefer present values to those of the past. Courts
themselves are key arbiters and shapers of such present values in our legal culture, as
articulated through their recent constitutional interpretations and also through judicial
137 See generally DwORKIN, supra note 94, at 313-14, 337-38,348-50; Eskridge,supra note
94, at 1482-84; Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The
Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REv. 672, 729-32
(1987).
138 See id. at 687-718 (describing the Court's reliance on agency innovations as part of its
decisions updating 1933 Glass-Steagall Act in a way that ended separation of commercial and
investment banking); see also Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), 517 U.S. 735,735-42 (1996) (upholding
deference to new agency interpretation that is inconsistent with prior agency positions, reasoning in
part that "[such] change is not invalidating, since the whole point of Chevron is to leave the
discretion provided by the ambiguities of a statute with the implementing agency").
139 See generally Eskridge, supra note 94, at 1527.
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decisions that endorse newer ideological norms or that embrace the policy values of
separate statutory directives. Because the courts themselves are often primarily
responsible for inaugurating these "evolving" values and priorities, an approach that
emphasizes the legitimacy of their role will subtly tilt the present meaning of statutes
toward policy preferences embraced by the judiciary.
To take just one example, the Supreme Court since the early 1960s has created a
robust First Amendment protection against government-compelled speech or
association.140 In the labor relations setting, Congress had previously authorized
agency shop arrangements to address various problems associated with free
ridership. 141 The Court's decisions constitutionalizing individual employees' right to
refrain initially created some tension with Congress's evident purpose of allowing
democratically chosen unions to expend agency fees outside the collective bargaining
context in order to improve their members' working conditions. 142
Over the past twenty-five years, however, the Court-relying explicitly or
implicitly on the canon of avoiding constitutional questions-has creatively construed
federal labor law statutes so as to strengthen private employees' rights to refrain from
supporting union activities. 143 The Court's federal statutory decisions, along with
140 See, e.g., Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1,9-17 (1990) (upholding attomeys' right
to refrain from certain messages promulgated, or activities engaged in, bythe state bar); Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 232-37 (1977) (upholding employee's right to refrain from
participation in certain union activities or messages); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714-17
(1977) (upholding individual's right to refrain from displaying state motto on a license plate). The
Supreme Court initially articulated a First Amendment right to refrain in West Virginia State Board
ofEducation v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,635-42 (1943), which involved a religiously-based refusal
to salute the flag; the Court gave the theory more general application in the 1960s and 1970s. See
generally Victor Brudney, Association, Advocacy, andthe FirstAmendment, 4 WM. & MARY BELL
RTS. J. 1 (1995) (examining individual's right to refrain from advocacy activities engaged in by
large associations).
141 See 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1994) (Railway Labor Act); 29 U.S.C. § 158(aX3) (1994) (NLRA).
See generally Ry. Employees' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 233-38 (1956); see also United
States v. C.I.O., 335 U.S. 106, 120-24 (1948) (holding that Congress in the 1947 Taft-HartleyAct
did not prohibit unions from publishing periodicals or pamphlets that urged members to support
particular political candidates).
142 See Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 812-18 (1961) (Frankfurter &
Harlan, J.J., dissenting) (documenting organized labor's longstanding practice of making
expenditures on broad range of issues with aim of preserving or promoting unions' role as effective
bargaining agents).
143 See, e.g., Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 444-48 (1984) (reframing First
Amendment challenge to certain union expenditures brought by objecting feepayers as a challenge
based on judicially articulated standard governing expenditures chargeable under Railway Labor
Act (RLA), and then vindicating feepayers' statutory challenge in important respects);
Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 754 (1988) (construing National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) to protect individual employees' rights of non-association by relying on its
own RLA precedents as controlling).
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companion cases construing state collective bargaining statutes, have impaired
unions' ability to expend funds on activities away from the bargaining table, even
when those activities plainly advance the economic interests of the individuals the
unions represent. 144 These restrictions derive their persuasive force from the Court's
evolving First Amendment-related concerns, rather than from fidelity to Congress's
understanding when it enacted agency shop arrangements in the 1940s and 1950s. 145
The Court's constitutional solicitude for individual objectors also influenced its
1985 decision in a related statutory area, limiting anions' ability to maintain internal
discipline while engaged in concerted activity. In Pattern Makers' League of North
America v. NLRB,146 the Court held that a union may not fine its own members when
they resign during a strike in violation of the union constitution. The decision
represented a break with authority from prior decades, authority predicated in part on
a labor law proviso that allows unions to prescribe their own membership rules.147
Earlier Court decisions in this area emphasized the importance of the union's ability,
during a strike, "to protect against erosion [of] its status ... through reasonable
[internal] discipline .... ,1 48 By contrast, Justice Powell in Pattern Makers'focused
on the statute's "implicit" policy of voluntary unionism, 149 and reasoned that this
policy foreclosed any restrictions on employees' rights to resign from the union. This
144 See, e.g., Ellis, 466 U.S. at 451-53 (holding that objecting bargaining unit members may
not be charged for union expenditures to organize additional employees, even if employees are
doing the same work for the same employer in another location); id. at 453 (holding that objecting
bargaining unit members may not be charged for union expenditures to support litigation arising
outside the bargaining unit, even if the issue being litigated applies directly to objectors' bargaining
unit or uniformly to all of the employer's bargaining units); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500
U.S. 507, 519-22 (1991) (in a public employment context, holding that objecting bargaining unit
members may not be charged for union lobbying that improves the terms and conditions of
employment outside the collective bargaining setting).
145 See, e.g., Norman L. Cantor, Forced Payments to Service Institutions and Constitutional
Interests in Ideological Non-Association, 36 RUTGERS L. REv. 3,7-14,40-46 (1983) (describing
Supreme Court decisions as, in effect, overriding the congressional intent that unions be able to
collect fees to support a broad range of representational services, including services performed
outside the collective bargaining arena); Reuel E. Schiller, From Group Rights to Individual
Liberties: Post-War Labor Law, Liberalism, and the Waning of Union Strength, 20 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 1,29,41-46,64-69 (1999) (discussing Court's shift away from pluralist-inspired
protection for free speech rights of unions to engage in politics and toward emphasis on free
speech rights of individuals objecting to their union's activities).
146 473 U.S. 95, 104-14 (1985).
147 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(bXl XA) (1994) (prohibiting union restraint orcoercion of employees
in the exercise of their § 157 rights: "Provided [t]hat this paragraph shall not impair the right of a
labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of
membership therein.").
148 See NLRB v. Boeing, 412 U.S. 67, 72-73 (1973); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.,
388 U.S. 175, 180-83 (1967).
149 Pattern Makers', 473 U.S. at 104-O5.
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readjustment of congressional policy values seems related to, if not derived from, the
Court's concomitant interest in individual employees' freedom to avoid associating
with the unions that represent them. 150 Even assuming these various developments in
statutory policy are regarded as salutary in normative terms, they are best understood
as reflecting priorities of the contemporary judiciary rather than the enacting
Congress.
A second way in which dynamic interpretation encourages judicial independence
is in its requirement that the current Congress assemble an enacting coalition in order
to revisit the courts' "updating" interpretations. As has already been noted, this
legislative correction process is fraught with difficulty. Statutory overrides are
inhibited by lack of time and resources, both for monitoring effectively the vast array
of judicial decisions and for securing the coalition support and agenda access to
overturn decisions that are deemed objectionable. 15 1
Such challenges can hardly be described as unanticipated. The federal legislative
process was designed as a kind of obstacle race, featuring delegation to committees,
rules that limit the agenda for floor action, and requirements of bicameralism and
presentment. These constitutional and practical constraints present substantial
impediments to the enactment of new laws, especially laws that modify contentious
regulatory schemes. One corollary is that the older regulatory statutes tend to survive
largely intact despite the erosion of the political coalitions and popular intensity that
initially produced them. Their vitality may be overcome in the congressional arena
only if a new political coalition or wave of public commitment is powerful and
sustained enough to prevail over institutional gridlock or inertia. Yet, by privileging
the "updated" perspectives of the federal judiciary, the dynamic approach invites
courts to alter-at times fundamentally--the meaning of regulatory schemes that have
not been expanded, diluted, or even specifically addressed by subsequent
congressional action.
As was the case with textualism, we may at times wish to promote a more
autonomous judicial role under the rubric of dynamic interpretation. In the case of
older "common law"-type statutes that create a cause of action but little else, or that
rely on majestic generalities accompanied by spare regulatory specifics, it may be
prudent to encourage the evolution of legislative meaning through accretions of
judicial lawmaking. 152 That is how courts typically answer questions raised in
comparably open or unconstrained areas of common law or constitutional law. There
150 See id. at 106 n. 16 (relying on Ellis to argue that membership in a union has been reduced
to a"financial core" of fee-paying, and this core does not include susceptibility to union discipline
for resigning from "full member" status).
151 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
152 See, e.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 259, 266-70 (1981)
(applying considerations of current public policy to explicate meaning of42 U.S.C. § 1983); Smith
v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30,46-50 (1983) (same); id. at 93-94 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (same). See
generally Eskridge, supra note 94, at 1486-88.
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also may be instances in which regulatory statutes are in some tension with one
another, and courts can play a constructive role by coordinating such overlapping
objectives or competing requirements.) 53
Still, it seems worth asking whether courts more generally are well suited to the
task of modifying the detailed and reticulated regulatory structures created by
Congress. Given the systemic "landscape altering" that the enacting legislature meant
to achieve in such instances, one might hesitate before concluding that subsequent
changes wholly outside the ambit of a given regulatory scheme should subject that
scheme to piecemeal tampering by the judiciary. And once again, assuming one
supports the value of a dynamic approach at least in some instances, it is useful to
recognize the ways in which such support tends to vindicate a more independent role
for federal judges when interpreting statutes.
D. Intentionalism and Devotion to Legislative Purpose
An intentionalist approach to the meaning of federal statutes is more likely than
its interpretive "competitors" to further the relatively dependent judicial role initially
identified as desirable from a separation of powers standpoint. In an era when
comprehensive regulatory statutes have supplanted judge-made common law as the
primary source of public or societal consensus, 15 4 the courts' efforts to discern and
apply particular legislative intent, or to extrapolate from original legislative
purpose, 155 have been characterized as essentially that of junior partner in the
lawmaking enterprise.156 Assuming that evidence of such intent or purpose can be
153 See, e.g., J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 130-46
(2001) (giving distinct effect to two overlapping patent statutes); Gilmerv. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20,27-29 (1991) (elevating Congress's general policy supporting arbitration over
its more specifically stated policy favoring judicial access to vindicate federal civil rights
protections); United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123-25 (1979) (reconciling two
overlapping criminal law provisions by relying in part on the policy of respect for prosecutorial
discretion).
154 See generally GuiDo CAIABRESi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUrEs (1982);
POpKIN, supra note 98, at 131.
155 It is not necessary to distinguish here between "hard" intentionalism, seeking to discover
how the enacting Congress actually intended the interpretive matter to be resolved (or would have
intended it to be resolved had the issue been raised during pre-enactment deliberation), and "softer"
intentionalism, drawing on the original purposes of the legislation as a surrogate to determine
which interpretation best comports with those purposes. See Eskridge, supra note 94, at 1479-80.
156 See, e.g., HART & SACKS, supra note 95, at 1374 (discussing the courts' approach to
statutory interpretation based on "[r]espect [for] the position of the legislature as the chief policy-
determining agency of the society"); Posner, supra note 100, at 189-90 (analogizing judges to
platoon commanders operating within a military hierarchy).
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evaluated in a suitably cautious manner,15 7 advocates of the intentionalist approach
maintain that legislative history constitutes relevant, probative evidence of what
Congress was seeking to accomplish. Principled reliance on such evidence to help
resolve interpretive uncertainties reinforces the less autonomous aspects of judicial
authority, by preferring as a default rule the policy choices expressed by key
participants from the enacting legislature rather than the judicially crafted logic of
language or the judicially projected sense of contemporary legal and social values.
Once again, it is relevant in this regard that members of Congress generally seem to
view legislative history as valuable to their own understanding of the text on which
they vote. 158
Judge Posner, whose scholarly writings place him firmly in the intentionalist
camp,159 has provided several perhaps unintentional examples of how this relatively
dependent judicial role may be manifested in practice. In a series of majority opinions
construing provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), Judge
Posner has expressed personal dismay over what he regards as special interest
legislation celebrating the "middle-aged ... [as] an oppressed minority...."I 60 He has
voiced particular concern that "the quality of American higher education is
endangered by the prospect of faculty gerontocracies" protected under the ADEA, 161
as well as expressing mock disbelief that Congress could have had the temerity to
abolish mandatory retirement without regard to the inefficient social consequences of
such a law. 162 In each of these cases, however, Posner, writing for a unanimous
157 For extended responses to claims that legislative history is inherently unreliable because
the circumstances of its production render it corrupt or unrepresentative on a systemic basis, see
Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv.
845, 864-67, 872-74 (1992); Brudney, supra note 100, at 47-56.
158 See Orrin Hatch, Legislative History: 7bol of Construction or Destruction, 11 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 43, 46-48 (1988) (concluding that notwithstanding occasional abuses in the
process, legislative history can serve to reflect broad understandings about statutory text, offer
insights when a provision is produced in the course of floor debate, and prevent slippage from
agreements reached in Congress); supra note 112 and accompanying text (particularly the
congressional sources). See generally Bank One Chi., N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516
U.S. 264,276-77 (1996) (Stevens, J., concurring) (maintaining that for text prepared in committee
that enjoys bipartisan support, "since most members are content to endorse the views of the
responsible committees, the intent of those involved in the drafting process is properly regarded as
the intent of the entire Congress").
159 See generally Posner, supra note 100, at 186-212; POSNER, supra note 109, at 262-72,
276-93.
160 Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398,406 (7th Cir. 1990).
161 Karlen v. City Coils. of Chi., 837 F.2d 314, 320 (7th Cir. 1988).
162 See EEOC v. G-K-G, Inc., 39 F.3d 740, 746 (7th Cir. 1994) (observing, with respect to
the plaintiff, that "[h]is bosses may simply have thought that 70 is when people should retire, but of
course that is a forbidden ground [under the ADEA]. People do age, regardless of what some of
the most optimistic backers of the law may have thought.").
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Seventh Circuit panel, interpreted inconclusive ADEA language in favor of older
employees. 163 In doing so, he emphasized the importance of enforcing the
understanding reached by enacting Congresses, even while expressing his own
distaste for the public values embodied in those understandings. 164
Of course, devotion to legislative intent or purpose can give rise to shortcomings
of its own. One problem has already been noted: comparative lack of transparency
and accountability may at times permit, if not encourage, staff and lobbyists to
produce legislative record materials of dubious reliability. 165 Beyond these episodic
abuses in production, a historically restricted approach to the meaning of text may
unduly favor the political or economic elites who were influential at the time of
enactment. This possibility typically would come into play if the enacting Congress
had disclosed no specific intent with respect to a controversy now before the courts.
In such a setting, any judicial effort to reconstruct input that might have come from
various affected individuals and groups seems likely to overvalue organized interests
that were articulate and vocal at the time, while undervaluing how diffuse, less
cohesive groups might have reacted had the current controversy been raised. 166
163 See id. at 748-49 (affirmingjury verdict of back pay and liquidated damages becausejury
could reasonably have found the employer willfully violated ADEA by firing older salesman);
Shager, 913 F.2d at 406-07 (reversing district court grant of summary judgment against a
discharged sales representative because a reasonable jury could have concluded that the company
fired him due to his age rather than because he was an unsatisfactory worker); Karlen, 837 F.2d at
320 (reversing district court grant ofsummaryjudgment against three college professors because a
reasonable jury could have found that the employer's early retirement program was an unlawful
subterfuge to evade the purposes of the ADEA).
164 See, e.g., Shager, 913 F.2d at 406-07 (observing that "[my] sanguine view of the power
of the marketplace [to deter age discrimination more efficiently than the law] was not shared by the
framers and supporters of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and we shall not subvert the
Act by upholding precipitate grants of summaryjudgment to defendants"); Karlen, 837 F.2d at 320
(noting that "the colleges and universities lobbied hard with Congress against the raising of the
minimum mandatory retirement age [above 65].... and they are a powerful lobby. They lost, and
they cannot be allowed by indirection to reinstitute what was for so long the age-65 mandatory
retirement norm.").
165 See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
166 One example involves the long-running dispute over the judiciallycreated exemption of
baseball from antitrust coverage. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Fed. Baseball Club of
Balt., Inc. v. Nat'l League of Prof I Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). From an originalist
standpoint, it seems likely that team owners and principal advertisers would have scoffed at any
effort to apply the Sherman or Clayton Acts to "the business of baseball" in the early20th century,
while players and fans would scarcely have been knowledgeable about such antitrust matters.
Thus, an effort to reconstruct what Congress would have done if the subject of a baseball
exemption had been raised in the 1920s seems likely to yield a different result than an attempt to
apply the statutory text in current circumstances, when players are far more effective as lobbyists
and fans arguably are more impatient with threats of franchise relocation by owners. See Stephen
F. Ross, Reconsidering Flood v. Kuhn, 12 U. MIAMI ENT-. & SPORTS L. REv. 169, 187, 202-03
(1995).
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An originalist focus also may make it harder for statutes to be effective over time
when applied in new or unforeseeable settings. This difficulty can be observed in
various efforts to apply the National Labor Relations Act-a New Deal-era statute
drafted to promote and protect group action in an industrialized setting-to modem
workplaces that are decidedly post-industrial. In recent decades, the Labor Board and
the federal courts have struggled to apply the intent of the 1935 and 1947 Congresses
when determining whether union organizers should have access to service sector
workers in shopping malls, 167 or whether professional employees who exercise
independent authority in their jobs should have access to a protected bargaining
relationship at all. 168 Although courts might be aided in addressing these
controversies by adopting a generous approach to extrapolating from congressional
purposes, such generosity at some point undermines the notion that courts are actually
relying on manifestations of legislative intent. 169
This kind of tension implicates the broader question of whether to view an
independent judiciary as a preferred agent of social and legal progress. To the extent
we regard courts as "carriers and executors"1 70 of such progress, we are likely to cede
them greater authority to shape the evolving meaning of text, and to determine future
policy directions for a given regulatory scheme. Conversely, insofar as we remain
skeptical that judges have the expertise to anticipate politically preferred and socially
worthwhile policy directions, or the will to advance these policies when theyperceive
them to exist, we will tend to adopt a more circumspect view toward judicial
capabilities in the statutory arena. Such skepticism may well lead us to opt for a
stronger intentionalist or purposive anchor, leaving courts more dependent on the best
evidence of what enacting Congresses expected to accomplish or hoped they would
accomplish.
As this brief review of different approaches suggests, federal judges interpreting
statutes seek to fulfill their "dependent" role in distinctive ways. Whether performing
primarily as experts on linguistic usage, architects of evolving values, or investigators
into archival intent, courts inevitably assert their independent authority to impose
167 See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 539-41 (1992) (reversing the Labor Board
and providing extremely limited access for union organizers in a shopping mall setting). See
generally Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property and Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. REv.
305 (1994).
168 See NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571,576-84 (1994) (excluding
many nurses from NLRA coverage as "supervisors"); NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672,679-
91 (1980) (excluding university faculty from NLRA coverage as "managers"). See generally David
M. Rabban, Can American Labor Law Accommodate Collective Bargaining by Professional
Employees?, 99 YALE L.J. 689 (1990).
169 See generally Pub. Citizen v. United States Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440,472-73 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (criticizing majority's reliance on the "spirit" of the statute and the
"intention of its makers" and adding "[t]he problem with spirits is that they tend to reflect less the
views of the world whence they come than the views of those who seek their advice").
170 ALEXANDER M. BIcKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 19 (1970).
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meaning on provisions of the United States Code. By focusing on the continuum
between dependent and independent judicial action in the realm of statutory
interpretation, we can promote greater candor as to the reasons why we may decide to
value, or devalue, that performance.
CONCLUSION
What has been discussed in Parts I and I1 is not meant to call into question the
basic commitment to judicial independence with which we began.171 At the
foundational level, independent courts are essential in order to fulfill both rule-of-law
and separation-of-powers functions under our constitutional regime. Once we move
beyond that foundation, however, we face more complex tradeoffs when considering
the implications of judicial independence. Analyzing the possible influence of
personal traits and pre-judicial activities, and assessing the potential impact of
particular methods ofjudicial reasoning, can help us to recognize the ways in which
"more judicial independence" is not always a good thing.
With respect to judicial background, both the executive and legislative branches
promote important values of their own when they examine the personal and political
background of prospective nominees in monitoring the judicial selection process.172
We should be critical of occasional excesses in that monitoring effort, but at the same
time encourage increased awareness of, and sophistication about, the role ofjudges'
political and personal backgrounds in their decisionmaking processes. That
sophistication should in turn enrich our understanding of how the rule of law evolves.
We also need to develop greater appreciation for how methods ofjudicial reasoning
in the interpretation of statutes may reflect varying degrees of independence being
exercised by federal courts. That appreciation should enable us to locate courts more
responsibly as power-sharing entities in relation to the Congress that prescribes the
laws and the executive agencies that enforce them.
171 See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
172 See generally Newman, supra note 40, at 12.
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